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PREFACE
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Bar Associ-
ation joins numerous other groups in the aviation community in
their concern over a perceived trend of federal, state and local
governmental authorities to initiate criminal prosecutions
against aviation professionals for acts and omissions that hereto-
fore have been treated solely as civil infractions. Regulatory
agencies often employ an "emphasis" or "special safety enhance-
ment" approach to enforcement, as illustrated by the NTSB's/
Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) current runway incur-
sion reduction program.I
There is nothing new about criminal prosecution by federal
and state authorities of individuals for acts that also violate civil
regulations. In fact, several federal statutes and regulations, in-
cluding the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), establish par-
allel criminal and administrative enforcement mechanisms. 2
Notwithstanding these salutary common goals, there has been
substantial concern that the increased involvement of criminal
investigators actually may be detrimental to aviation safety, since
I FAA RUNWAY SAFETY REPORT: RUNWAY INCURSION SEVERITY TRENDS AT Tow-
ERED AIRPORTS IN THE UNITED STATES (June 2001), available at http://
www.faa.gov/apa/faarinway-safety-re portv4.pdf.
2 Examples include airline passengers carrying weapons aboard aircraft and
pilots operating common carrier aircraft under the influence of alcohol or a con-
trolled substance. Such cases envision cooperation between civil and criminal
investigatorial and prosecutorial authorities to achieve the joint goals of enforc-
ing the law and deterring future misconduct.
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aviation professionals fear that routine business decisions could
now become the basis for criminal prosecutions. As a result of
the increased involvement of criminal investigators, these wit-
nesses could become more guarded when dealing with accident
and safety investigators. This, in turn, could lead to less-in-
formed investigations, at the expense of aviation safety.
For these reasons, further inquiry and analysis of this problem
is suggested. For example, what effect will a climate of fear have
on the ability of NTSB or FAA investigators to interview wit-
nesses? Will the reluctance of witnesses to disclose critical facts
thwart the fact-finding process to the point where the NTSB will
be unable to determine the cause or probable cause of an acci-
dent, or develop accurate safety recommendations? How would
such a trend impact current FAA and industry efforts to be
"partners" in advancing aviation safety by sharing information
voluntarily? Does it encourage selective prosecution in high visi-
bility accidents, as some commentators have suggested? Lastly,
what are the practical implications for aviation legal practition-
ers in advising clients regarding voluntary cooperation with in-
vestigating agencies such as the NTSB and the FAA?
With these concerns in mind, the NTSB Bar Association cre-
ated its Select Committee on Aviation Public Policy and asked
that Committee to explore these issues and to report its findings
to the Association. The Board of Directors of the NTSB Bar As-
sociation has reviewed the Committee's work and recommenda-
tions and by majority vote has authorized this paper for
publication,3 adopting it as the official position of the NTSB Bar
Association on the subjects addressed herein.
The Committee asked me to thank Ms. Pam Herrington for
her assistance and personal commitment in the preparation of
the paper. In addition, our organization gratefully acknowl-
edges the contribution of the Journal of Air Law and Commerce
at Southern Methodist University for encouraging us to format
our work for publication.
Michael L. Dworkin
President
National Transportation Safety Board Bar Association
3 One Director, Loretta Alkalay, did not concur with the Committee's work
and recommendations and dissented from the Board's authorizing this paper for
publication.
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I. BACKGROUND
Following a French hot air balloon "disaster" in 1852, local
governmental authorities obtained criminal sanctions against
the pilot who caused the accident.4 Despite the precedent of
this early prosecution, government authorities have not pressed
the use of criminal law to influence the conduct of aviation pro-
fessionals in the performance of their duties. This hands-off ap-
proach by prosecutors has been based largely on the sensible
assumption that the individuals involved had absolutely no in-
tention of causing the harm attributed to their activities, or oth-
erwise to commit any kind of criminal offense.
In the wake of more recent aircraft mishaps, however, there
has been an increasing perception within the aviation commu-
nity that federal and state prosecutors are becoming more
prone to resort to criminal sanctions to judge the conduct of
companies and individuals in the aviation community.6 In the
year 2000 alone, five major industry and government forums
considered the issues surrounding the criminalization of avia-
tion accidents and incidents.7 Representatives of all three
4 Art A. Van Wijk, Criminal Liability of Pilots Following an Airline Accident: A His-
tory of the Issue Within the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations
(IFALPA), 9 AIR L. 66 (1984) (referring to Cour de Cassation, 14 aotit 1852. D.
52.5.194). Unfortunately, the referenced document provides no description or
details of the nature of the "disaster" or the specific sanctions imposed.
5 Richard H. Jones, Criminal Prosecution of Civil Airmen Following Aircraft Acci-
dents: A Dangerous Trend, 1 AIR & SPACE L. 3, 8 (1984).
6 See Oil and Water, Cats and Dogs, Editorial, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb.
4, 2002, at 70; Michael J. Holland, Criminalization of Negligence: The "Third
Rail" in Aviation Accident Litigation, presented at the Joint Seminar on Current
Aviation Law Developments, Florida State Bar Association and NTSB Bar Associa-
tion, Pensacola, Florida (Nov. 2001); Michel F. Baumeister and Dorothea M.
Capone, Criminalizing Aviation Misconduct: Valujet and Beyond-The Trend
and Issues Faced by the Aviation Community, presented at SMU Air Law Sympo-
sium (Feb. 2001); David Collogan, Turning Accidents into Crimes, Business and
Commercial Aviation (Sept. 2000); "Inadvertent" Safety Violations Key Element In Im-
munity From Prosecution, 45 AIR SAFETY WK. 1 (Nov. 9, 1998); James Holahan &
Stephane Guibaud, Euro-Pilots Who Err May Face Criminal Charges, AIR LINE PILOT,
at 24 (Apr. 1994); Jones, supra note 5, at 9; Paul McCarthy, Commentary: Criminal
Liability of Pilots, AIR LINE PILOT, at 8 (June 1993); W. Guldimann, Some Legal
Aspects of Aircraft Accident Investigations, 15 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 99, 100
(1990); Phillip J. Kolczynski, The Criminal Liability of Aviators and Related Issues of
Mixed Criminal-Civil Litigation: "A Venture in the Twilight Zone, "51 J. AIR L. & CoM.
1 (1985); Richard H. Jones, Criminal Prosecution of Civil Airmen Following Aircraft
Accidents: A Dangerous Trend, 1 AIR & SPACE L. 3, 8 (1984).
7 The Trend Toward Criminalization of Aircraft Accidents: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 106th Cong. 105
(2000) (statements of Daniel Campbell, Managing Director, NTSB; Marshall S.
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branches of the federal government have expressed similar con-
cern in connection with the effects of this perceived trend.
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue in connection with
its review of the criminal case that resulted from the 1996 crash
of Valujet Flight 592.8 In vacating the convictions of SabreTech
for recklessly causing the transportation of hazardous material
in air commerce, the court noted, "The record reflects that
these aviation repair station personnel committed mistakes, but
they did not commit crimes."9 In reaching its conclusion, the
court also noted that SabreTech's employees "did not intend to
kill" the victims of that accident. 10
In enacting the National Transportation Safety Board Amend-
ments Act of 2000,11 the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation made the following comments:
Recently, several NTSB accident investigations have been im-
peded as other non-transportation related agencies have initi-
ated their own separate investigations. In some investigations,
court orders have been issued to prevent the NTSB from testing
Filler, Counsel, Aeronautical Repair Station Assoc.; Guy A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney,
S.D. Fla., Captain Paul McCarthy, Executive Air Safety Chairman, Air Line Pilots
Assoc.; Stuart Matthews, President and CEO, Flight Safety Foundation; Robert P.
Warren, Senior V.P., Counsel, and Secretary, Air Transport Assoc. of America)
[hereinafter Criminalization of Aircraft Accidents]; NTSB Bar Association Aviation
Law Conference (Oct. 20, 2000) (featuring a panel on Catching Criminals in Avia-
tion); American Bar Association Aviation Litigation Committee's 6th Annual Avia-
tion Litigation Seminar, "Challenges in the New Millenium" (June 1, 2000)
(featuring a panel discussion on The Criminalization of Aviation (Mis)Conduct:
Trend or Anomaly); NTSB Symposium, "Transportation Safety and the Law" (Apr.
25-26, 2000) (devoting an entire day to the subject, Accidental Crimes or Criminal
Accidents; at the symposium, a number of panels on criminal proceedings dis-
cussed such questions as: What crimes are accidents, and when do accidents be-
come criminal? What is the relationship between pre-incident regulatory
compliance and the likelihood of criminal inquiry? How should companies re-
spond to the possibility of parallel criminal and accident investigations? What
rules of process and evidence apply when parallel accident and criminal inquiries
go forward? What are the respective roles and proper confines of the indepen-
dent accident board, the regulator, and the prosecutor?); American Bar Associa-
tion Forum on Air and Space Law's Annual Update Conference (Jan. 31, 2000)
(featuring a panel discussion on Criminal Prosecution of Violators of the Federal Avia-
tion Regulations).
8 United States v. SabreTech, Inc., 271 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2001).
9 Id. at 1019-20 (concluding that the hazardous materials regulations cited by
the government had not been authorized by the Federal Aviation Act, as was
required "to support the reckless counts").
10 Id. at 1025.
11 National Transportation Safety Board Amendments Act of 2000, Pub. L.
106-424 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
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critical components. Safety Board investigators also have been
unable to interview transportation operators as criminal and civil
litigation has increased. These criminal investigations have im-
pacted NTSB investigations into the Valujet crash, the FineAir
DC-9 cargo crash, and a grade crossing accident at Indiana.
The delays caused by these prosecution inquiries have restrained the
Board's capability to make timely determinations of probable cause and
issue safety recommendations. To ensure that NTSB will continue
to be capable of exercising its responsibilities in a timely and
judicious manner, the bill includes language reiterating NTSB's
existing jurisdiction, whether the accident is accidental or inten-
tional. The Committee fully expects the NTSB to maintain its
longstanding policy of accommodating its investigatory needs to
the unique needs of criminal investigations when criminal be-
havior is suspected or demonstrated. 12
In opening the July 27, 2000 hearings of the Aviation Subcom-
mittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Commit-
tee, Chairman John Duncan (R-TN) and Ranking Member
William Lipinski (D-IL) expressed bipartisan concern with the
trend toward "criminalizing negligent and unintentional con-
duct that may have contributed to an aviation accident."13
As early as the Twenty-First Annual Air Law Symposium at
Southern Methodist University, Admiral Donald Engen, then-
FAA Administrator, former NTSB Member, and former combat
Naval aviator, said "I'm not sure that the next pilot will cooper-
ate, especially if he thinks that information provided to safety
investigators might be used by other parties in a criminal prose-
cution."' 4 The FAA continues to be concerned about the de-
creased flow of information that results from the fear of
criminal prosecution. In 1998, the FAA Office of System Safety
said: "the fear of criminal prosecution for violations of aviation
safety laws and regulations ... obviously discourages the flow of
12 S. REP. No. 106-386, at 4 (2000) (emphasis added).
1-3 Criminalization of Aircraft Accidents, supra note 6 (statement of Rep. William
Lipinski, D-IL).
14 George Stein, Head of FAA Criticizes Hahns Probe of Pilots, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8,
1987, at Metro 2 (remarks made during the 21st Annual Air Law Symposium at
Southern Methodist University); see also Eric Malnic, FAA Backs Up Its Vow To Get
Tough On Errant Pilots, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1987 at 1 (noting concerns over local
criminal prosecutions as summarized by one regional counsel for the FAA who
said "criminal prosecutions might undermine the 'traditional cooperation' be-
tween pilots and regulating agencies").
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aviation safety information."' 5 In fact, the FAA was concerned
enough to ask ICAO to examine whether criminal prosecutions
discourage the flow of safety information. 6
Several criminal investigations and prosecutions have contrib-
uted to this increasing perception.' 7 The premier example, of
15 Aviation Safety Information: Four Potential Problems; Four Proposed Solu-
tions, FAA Office of System Safety (Jan. 1998), at http://nasdac.faa.gov/gain/
GAINinformation/infoprob.htm.
16 Id. at C.
17 Examples include:
USAIR 5050 ACCIDENT - In 1989, following an aborted takeoff,
USAir Flight 5050 ended up in the East River just off LaGuardia
Airport in New York. In the wake of that accident, the Borough of
Queens District Attorney convened a grand jury to determine if
criminal charges should be filed. Criminalization ofAircraft Accidents,
supra note 6 (statement of Captain Paul McCarthy).
EASTERN AIRLINES MAINTENANCE - In 1991, the Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) obtained a sixty-count indictment against Eastern Air-
lines, as well as nine of its employees for the falsification of aircraft
maintenance log books, work cards, and computer entries. Prose-
cutors, using the federal mail and wire fraud statutes in the aviation
arena, charged that through the false statements, the defendants
had conspired to impede, impair, obstruct and defeat the functions
of the FAA to promote safety of flight. Eastern Airlines pled guilty
to the indictment against it and agreed to pay a $3.5 million fine.
The case against Ed Upton, Executive Vice President for Mainte-
nance, was ultimately dismissed for a violation of the speedy trial
requirement. See Erik Calonius, The FAA's Loose Grip on Air Safety,
FORTUNE, Oct. 8, 1990 at 85.
TWA 800 ACCIDENT - On July 17, 1996, a TWA Boeing-747 crashed
into the Atlantic Ocean shortly after taking off from John F. Ken-
nedy International Airport in New York, killing all 230 persons
aboard. The FBI played a major role in the investigation of the
accident, amid widespread speculation that criminal misconduct
was involved in that accident. See Peg Tyre, FBI Concludes No Crimi-
nal Evidence in TWA 800 Crash, CNN (Nov. 18, 1997), at http://
www.cnn.com/US/9711/ 18/twa.presser.update.
ARROW AiR - In April 1998, after a three-year criminal investigation
conducted by the DOJ in conjunction with the DOT Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) and the FAA, the Miami-based cargo car-
rier pled guilty to charges that it falsified records to indicate that
parts were serviceable, even though the required airworthiness in-
spections had never been completed. The company agreed to pay
a $3 million fine. DOT OIG Semiannual Report to the Congress,
Apr. 1 - Sept. 30, 1998, at 21. See also Press Release, DOT OIG,
Guilty Pleas in Major Unprepared-Parts Settlements (May 1, 1998).
EXECUTIvE FREIGrr FORWARDERS - In May 1998, Angel Dante Fuen-
tes, the president of a freight forwarding company, pled guilty and
was sentenced to eight months in prison for shipping 500 pounds
of a highly corrosive pesticide on an American Airlines passenger
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jet. Press Release, DOT OIG, Illegal Hazmat Shipper Sentences
(May 22, 1998).
ALPA INTERNATIONAL, INC. - In July 1999, the Miami-based shipping
company and its president pled guilty to violating federal hazard-
ous materials regulations following an incident related to the deliv-
ery of printer toning fluid to an air carrier. Press Release, DOT
OIG, American Airlines Holding Company Pleads Guilty to Mishan-
dling Hazardous Waste at Miami International Airport (Dec. 16,
1999).
AIR-PRO, INC. - In 1999, the aircraft hose assembly manufacturer
and distributor entered a guilty plea for making false representa-
tions relating to the date of manufacture of aircraft hoses. Prosecu-
tors, using the federal mail and wire fraud statutes in the aviation
arena, charged that through the false statements, the defendants
had conspired to impede, impair, obstruct and defeat the functions
of the FAA to promote safety of flight. The indictment was ulti-
mately dismissed on other grounds. DOT OIG Semiannual Report
to the Congress, supra. See also Press Release, DOT OIG, Firm, Vice
President Plead Guilty in Substandard Aircraft Parts Case (July 7,
1999).
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. - In late 1999, American Airlines pled
guilty to criminal charges in which it admitted violating federal laws
governing the storage of hazardous materials. In addition to an $8
million fine, American agreed to enter into a compliance plan, a
move that further signals an intention of prosecutors to assume a
role traditionally held by the FAA. Upon the announcement of
American's plea, prosecutors vowed, "there is more to come." South
Florida: Visible Bellwether of Growing Focus on Criminal Enforcement, AIR
SAFETY WEEK (May 1, 2000).
ALAsKA AIRLINES FLIGHT 261 - The investigation of the crash on
January 31, 2000 has included interviews of airlines employees with
their lawyers before not only NTSB and FAA investigators, but FBI
agents as well. Steve Miletich, Alaska Airlines Worker Wrote 'Panic'
Near LogEntry on Search for Parts, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 12, 2000 at Al.
The airline's maintenance operation was the subject of a federal
grand jury investigation even before the accident. Alaska Turns
Over Record6f" of Crash MD-80 to Grand Jury, AVIATION DAILY, May 12,
2000.
FINE AIRLINES FLIGHT 101 ACCIDENT - In March 2000, Fine Air and a
cargo handling firm, Aeromar Airlines, pled guilty to charges that
included making false statements and obstructing the govern-
ment's investigation by destroying and covering up evidence.
Within days of the crash, a former Fine Air pilot appeared on the
local television news and charged that Fine Air's management rou-
tinely required its employees to fly with improperly loaded cargo.
Ultimately, the NTSB determined that the probable cause of the
crash was improperly loaded cargo. This plea was in connection
with the August 7, 1997 crash of Fine Airlines flight 101 following
takeoff from Miami International Airport, killing five people. Pur-
suant to plea agreements, the companies were fined a total of $5
million dollars and given corporate probation. NTSB Docket No.
DCA97MA059.
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course, is the federal and state prosecutions of SabreTech, Inc.
(SabreTech) and three of its employees following the 1996
crash of Valujet Flight 592 into the Florida Everglades.
SabreTech was Valujet's maintenance contractor, whose em-
ployees improperly packaged and labeled expired chemical oxy-
gen generators before returning them to Valujet. The NTSB
concluded that the oxygen generators ignited shortly after take-
off and were a cause of the Valujet crash."'
This was the first full-scale criminal investigation into the facts
and circumstances underlying a major U.S. aviation disaster.
The charging decisions were notable because several federal
charges were based on maintenance records that had nothing
whatsoever to do with the occurrence of the crash.
If this trend toward conducting criminal investigations simul-
taneously with aircraft accident investigations becomes routine,
there is significant risk that the focus of future accident investi-
gations will shift to potential criminal liability of the aviation
professional rather than the determination of probable cause of
the accident, and the promotion of aviation safety. Since the
majority of accidents are caused by human error and not inten-
tional misconduct, aircraft accident investigations should pro-
ceed initially on the assumption that the accident did not occur
by reason of a criminal act. The investigative procedures and
protocols of the aviation professionals on the accident scene are
well suited to uncovering the facts of the case, including those
pointing to criminal misconduct. Nonetheless, the mere fact
SUNJET AVIATION, INC. - In April, 2000, FBI agents raided the Flor-
ida charter company that owned the jet that crashed in October
carrying pro golfer Payne Stewart and others, focusing on aircraft
maintenance records, particularly those relating to the emergency
oxygen and pressurization systems. FBI Confiscates Files in Crash that
Killed Golfer, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 12, 2001, at 6A.
18 Because of the discrepancies in SabreTech's paperwork involving the oxy-
gen generators, investigators from the FBI, FAA Security, DOT Inspector Gen-
eral, EPA, Miami-Dade Police and other regulatory agencies swarmed all over the
local SabreTech facility looking for any slight deviation from the norm, whether
it related to the Valujet crash or not. After a lengthy criminal investigation,
which included the review of hundreds of thousands of pages of documents, the
service of grand jury subpoenas, the immunization of witnesses, and the execu-
tion of search warrants, Florida prosecutors charged SabreTech with 220 counts
of murder and manslaughter. Similarly, federal prosecutors returned a twenty-
four count indictment against SabreTech and three of its employees charging
them with conspiring to falsify maintenance records, falsifying those records, vio-
lating laws regulating the carriage of hazardous materials, and unlawfully placing
destructive devices (the oxygen generators) aboard commercial aircraft.
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that the FAA and NTSB are more experienced and more capa-
ble than the Department of Justice at policing compliance with
the FARs does not mean that zealous federal, state or local pros-
ecutors will be content to leave the business of aviation investiga-
tion to the accident-investigating professionals. Indeed, even
though there is really no evidence that the aviation industry is
rife with fraud or various other forms of criminal activity, there
are those who would portray the situation in the aviation com-
munity as having reached the point of national crisis. Indeed,
after the Valujet case, the U.S. Attorney in Miami announced
publicly that criminal prosecutions of aviation professionals af-
ter an accident would be a "top priority" of his Administration.
Of course, criminal prosecutions in the aftermath of aviation
accidents always should be pursued whenever criminal activity is
suspected. In this regard, Congress recently has reaffirmed the
general authority of the NTSB to determine whether the cause
of an accident was truly accidental. In cases where the evidence
suggests that the accident was caused by nothing more than neg-
ligence, including mere pilot error, or a mechanic's mistake, the
necessary prerequisite to a criminal investigation is simply not
present. 9
19 While many of the examples contained in this article address the pilots and
mechanics whose errors led to an incident or accident, the themes are equally
applicable to the actions of any aviation professional that could lead to an acci-
dent. In fact, operations managers, air traffic controllers and maintenance per-
sonnel have also been targets of criminal prosecutions. With respect to
operations managers, see, e.g., Holahan & Guibaud, supra note 6, at 25 (charges
brought against three operations managers for failure to include de-icing situa-
tion in the operations manual following crash resulting from icing conditions).
With respect to air traffic controllers, see, e.g., Jones, supra note 5, at 9 (eight
Yugoslavian air traffic controllers charged with criminal negligence following
midair collision; one was found guilty and eventually served more than two-and-a-
half years of his seven year sentence). A five-year prison sentence was recently
levied on two Greek air traffic controllers who were found guilty of "negligent
manslaughter" with regard to a Ukranian Aerosweet YAK-42 that crashed into a
mountain in 1997 while under their "care." AVweb Vol. 6, Issue 51a (Dec. 18,
2000), at http://www.avweb.com/newswire/news0051a.html. The duo won their
release on appeal and it is unlikely that they will serve any prison time due to the
nature of Greek misdemeanor law, which allows guilty parties to pay off their
sentences at a rate of $5.20 per day, or about $9,500 for the entire sentence.
Finally, with respect to maintenance personnel, see, e.g., Erik Calonius, The FAA's
Loose Grip on Air Safety, FORTUNE, Oct. 8, 1990 at 85 (DOJ obtained 60-count fed-
eral indictment against Eastern Airlines and nine of its employees for mainte-
nance practices at the airline); Aircraft Mechanic Charged with Manslaughter in
Crash, MiAMI HERALD, Oct. 22, 1988, at ID (aircraft mechanic charged with man-
slaughter due to improper installation of an engine part).
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II. SUBSTANTIVE AVIATION AND CRIMINAL LAW
The aviation professional is always subject to criminal prosecu-
tion for violations of any criminal statute. Criminal prosecu-
tions also have been conducted for violations of regulations
prohibiting such things as unlicensed aerial advertising, 20 reck-
less flying,21 or endangerment of passengers or those on the
ground.
A. FEDERAL LAW
1. Title 49 U.S.C.
The provisions of Title 49 of the United States Code (Trans-
portation) include penalties that may be imposed upon aviation
programs for violations of its various statutory sections22 Along
with the more familiar civil penalties,23 these federal statutes
also provide criminal penalties for certain offenses committed
by individuals engaged in the aviation industry.24
Criminal penalties within Title 49 are delineated for specific
violations such as forgery of certificates, 25 refusal to testify
before the NTSB or the Secretary of Transportation in response
to a subpoena, 26 and for willful violation of security provisions of
Criminal prosecutions have been pursued in the aviation field for falsification of
documents. Paul B. Larsen, Air Law Education 1967-91, 56J. AIR L. & COM. 705,
714 (1991); Marshall S. Filler, Falsifying Maintenance Records, AIR LINE PILOT, June
1984, at 30.
20 See, e.g., Tatum v. City of Hallandale, 71 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1954).
21 See, e.g., Ward v. State, 374 A.2d 1118 (Md. 1977) (affirming suspended sen-
tence for reckless flying under Md. Code Ann. Art. 1A, § 10-1002); Sanders v.
State, 256 P.2d 205 (Okla. Crim. App. 1953) (affirming conviction for reckless
flying under Okla. Stat. tit. 3, § 139 (1951)).
22 49 U.S.C. §§ 4630146316 (1996).
23 With the recent reorganization of the aviation statutes which took effect on
July 5, 1994, civil penalties formerly under 49 U.S.C. app. § 1471 (1996) are now
addressed under 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 46301-46304 (1996), as well as under 49 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (judicial review of penalties) and§ 1155 (penalties by the NTSB during
the conduct of their aircraft accident investigation). For discussion of FAAjuris-
diction and its authority to impose civil sanctions, see infra note 188 and accompa-
nying text.
24 Criminal penalties were also reorganized in 1994. Criminal penalties for-
merly under 49 U.S.C. app. § 1472 are now addressed primarily under chapter
463 of Title 49, 49 U.S.C. §§ 46306, 46308-46316, as well as under 49 U.S.C.
§ 40113 (hazardous materials transportation violations) and tinder chapter 465,
49 U.S.C. §§ 4650146507 (Special Aircraft Jurisdiction of the United States).
25 49 U.S.C.A. § 46306 (1996) (formerly 49 U.S.C.A. app. 1472(b)).
26 Id. § 46313 (formerly 49 U.S.C.A. app. 14 7 2(g)).
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the Federal Aviation Program.27 In addition, there is a provision
for general criminal penalties for violations of certain federal air
commerce and safety statutes and regulations for which no spe-
cific penalty is otherwise provided. 28 The statute requires that
the violator acted both "knowingly and willfully" in connection
with the offense charged. 29
2. The False Statement Statute
The Department of Justice also prosecutes aviation-related
matters under certain provisions of Title 18 of the United States
Code, including those prohibiting the making of a materially
false statement regarding a fact within the jurisdiction of a fed-
eral agency." Violation of the False Statement Statute may re-
sult in a five-year prison term for each count charged, as well as
substantial fines and restitution.
The False Statement Statute .is one of the most flexible and
effective weapons of federal prosecutors, in large part because
the courts have interpreted it so expansively. For instance, al-
though the government must demonstrate that the defendant
knew the statement was false, some courts have held that the
government can meet that burden by showing that the defen-
dant acted with a reckless disregard for the truthfulness of the
statement coupled with a conscious effort to avoid learning the
t ti32truth. 2
Because the False Statement Statute is worded in language
that is industry non-specific, it can be applied broadly to any
subject matter, including aviation. Indeed, given the FAA regu-
latory scheme which measures compliance largely by reference
to the existence and accuracy of detailed documentation, it
would seem that virtually every aspect of document-keeping in
27 Id. § 46307 (authority for imposing imprisonment up to one year and a fine
of up to $10,000) (formerly 49 U.S.C.A. app. § 1523).
2. Id. § 46316.
29 Id.
30 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1996).
1 See Id. § 3571(b) (3) and (c)(3), which set the fines for federal felony of-
fenses (other than for certain specified offenses not applicable here) at not more
than $250,000 for individuals, and $500,000 for organizations, respectively.
32 See, e.g., United States v. Tamargo, 637 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1288 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Egenberg,
441 F.2d 441, 444 (2d Cir. 1971); see also United States v. Hester, 880 F.2d 799,
802 (4th Cir. 1989) (adopting the same formulation for the "knowingly" require-
ment in the provision criminalizing false statements in connection with acquisi-
tion of a firearm).
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the ordinary course of conducting an aviation business would
fall under the scrutiny of prosecutors who could cite the statute
as a basis for claiming a superior right to police the entire fed-
eral aviation regulatory scheme.
For example, accurate and complete documentation of the
performance of aviation maintenance is a touchstone require-
ment of the safety-oriented FARs. The failure to perform a
maintenance task properly, or to document it fully, 3 may lead
not only to a civil enforcement action for violation of an FAR,34
but also may give rise to a criminal prosecution under the False
Statement Statute.
Consequently, three questions may be posed with respect to
the use of the False Statement Statue in the context of aviation:
(1) whether or not the FAA, in drafting its regulatory scheme,
contemplated such broad use of the criminal sanctions of the
statute as a means of regulating behavior and promoting air
safety; (2) whether penalties authorized under the statute are
too harsh or too all-encompassing, when applied to the aviation
community; and (3) whether it is a salutary goal in the first
place, to engraft onto the body of aviation regulations, a statute
that creates general and broad-reaching criminal liability that
was never contemplated by Congress.
Prior to the recent crash of Flight 261 off the coast of Califor-
nia, Alaska Airlines was under investigation for allegedly falsify-
ing paperwork. When the accident occurred, law enforcement
agencies immediately placed themselves in the investigation and
denied some civil accident investigators access to certain key
wreckage components, maintenance records, and witnesses. 5
What appeared to be the most disturbing aspect of this intrusion
was the a priori assumption by the law enforcement agencies that
criminal activity must have been a cause of the accident.36 By
denying civil investigators access to valuable data, information,
and hardware, these law enforcement agencies hampered the
ability of the civil investigators to help determine the probable
cause of the accident.
33 The act of recording maintenance that was not actually performed is com-
monly referred to as "pencil whipping" or "pencil maintenance."
34 E.g., 14 C.F.R. §§ 43.9 through 43.12 (also cite to Parts 91, 121 and 135 sec-
tions on the subjects of enforcement actions for intentional false reporting).
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The Arrow Air indictment provides another example of the
application of the false statement statute to the aviation indus-
try. In that case, Arrow had affixed "Equipment Transfer
Records" (ETRs) to parts which had been removed from two
Boeing 727s that it had decided to "part out" rather than return
to service. The ETRs contained an entry that read "CERTIFIED
SERVICEABLE BY " The government's theory was that
the parts had not been inspected properly upon removal.
Therefore, the ETRs "statement" that they were serviceable was
knowingly and materially false in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
The False Statement Statute applies not only to "pencil whip-
ping," but also to statements made in interviews with the FAA,
NTSB or any federal agent. Until recently, many courts allowed
an individual being interviewed to answer inquiries from a fed-
eral agent with a general denial known as an "exculpatory no."
Those courts held that such a bare bones denial, without more,
was insufficient to constitute a false statement offense. Recently,
however, the United States Supreme Court abolished the "excul-
patory no" doctrine, holding that falsely answering "no" to an
investigator's question is indeed a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 7
3. Mail and Wire Fraud
Federal law prohibits participation in schemes to defraud us-
ing either the U.S. mail or interstate "wire" communications in-
cluding facsimiles, telephones, radio, television and
computers. 8 Violation of the mail or wire fraud statutes may
result in five-year prison terms for each count charged, as well as
substantial fines and restitution.
The government used the wire fraud statute to indict several
supervisory and management level employees of Eastern Air-
lines in 1991. The government's theory was that Eastern led its
passengers to believe that rigorous maintenance checks had
been performed on its planes, when in fact, the defendants
knew that such representations were false. In furtherance of the
alleged scheme to defraud, Eastern and several of its employees
were alleged to have falsified aircraft maintenance log books
and work cards and to have created false computer entries to
create the appearance that regularly scheduled maintenance
had been completed when, in fact, it had not. The indictment
'17 Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
-18 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (1996) (mail fraud) and § 1343 (wire fraud).
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charged that the defendants falsely and fraudulently conspired
to "impede, impair, obstruct and defeat" the lawful government
functions of the FAA to promote safety of flight and ensure that
aircraft are properly maintained. Eastern Airlines pled guilty to
the indictment and paid a $3.5 million fine. The case against
the Executive Vice-President of Maintenance was ultimately dis-
missed due to violations of the Federal Speedy Trial Act requir-
ing criminal prosecutions to be brought in a timely fashion.
4. Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) ren-
ders it unlawful for a person to offer or accept a hazardous ma-
terial for transportation in commerce without first complying
with detailed regulations prescribing how the hazardous materi-
als (hazmat) must be packed, labeled, described and trans-
ported. 9 Criminal penalties may be imposed where, in
violation of a hazardous material regulation, a person willfully
delivers hazmat to an air carrier or other operator of a civil air-
craft for transportation in air commerce or recklessly causes the
transportation of the property in air commerce.' While there is
some debate regarding the extent of the government's ability to
prosecute a person for recklessly causing the transportation of
property in air commerce, it is clear that prosecutors will con-
sider prosecuting companies for this reckless conduct.4 ' A crim-
inal violation of the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs)
may result in fines, imprisonment, or both.4 2
5. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
RCRA governs the transportation, storage, treatment, and dis-
posal of hazardous waste products, as well as the making of false
statements in required documents, manifests and labels.4 3
RCRA imposes criminal penalties up to $50,000 per day of viola-
39 49 U.S.C. § 5101 (1996) et seq. (formerly codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1801 et
seq.).
40 Id. § 46312.
41 See, e.g., United States v. SabreTech, Inc., 271 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2001) (in-
volving, among other allegations, an allegation that SabreTech, Inc., recklessly
caused the transportation of hazardous materials).
42 Id.; 49 U.S.C. § 5124 (1996) (stating that "[a] person knowingly violating
[tampering restrictions] of this title or willfully violating this chapter or a regula-
tion prescribed or order issued under this chapter shall be fined under title 18,
imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.").
43 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2002).
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tion and/or five years imprisonment for persons who "know-
ingly" commit certain violations of the Act's requirements. The
statute also defines a crime termed "knowing endangerment,"
the purpose of which is to provide more substantial felony pen-
alties when the violator "knows at the time that he thereby
places another person in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily injury."44 For "knowing endangerment" convictions, the
prison term is raised to fifteen years and corporate fines are
raised to $1,000,000 for each count. The knowing endanger-
ment provision could have serious implications in the event of a
particularly egregious RCRA violation deemed to be causally re-
lated to an aircraft accident.
6. Terrorism
Federal law prohibits the willful destruction of an aircraft or
aircraft facilities. Title 18 U.S.C. § 32 criminalizes, among other
things, willfully damaging an aircraft or aircraft facility, setting
fire to an aircraft or aircraft facility, placing a destructive device
or substance in an aircraft or aircraft facility or performing an
act of violence against an aircraft or aircraft facility. The statute
carries with it a penalty of twenty years imprisonment as well as
fines and restitution. In the event that a death results from a
violation of this statute, the penalty is increased to either life
imprisonment or the death penalty.45
When terrorism is clearly the precipitating cause of an aircraft
accident, such as the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon on September 11, 2001, criminal law enforcement of-
ficials must assume control of the criminal scene immediately.
As noted earlier, where clear criminal intent is involved, the goal
of promoting safety is best served by criminal investigations. In
such cases, the NTSB remains available to provide a significant
contribution through its technical expertise; however, its exper-
tise is of secondary importance to the investigation.
In spite of the fact that this statute clearly was enacted to fight
international terrorism, the United States used this statute to
charge SabreTech with violation of this statute in a case where
there was never an honest suspicion of terrorist activity as a
cause of the accident. SabreTech's mechanics had signed inac-
curate work cards indicating that safety caps had been installed
on removed oxygen generators, when, in fact, safety caps had
44 Id. at § 6928(e).
45 18 U.S.C. § 34 (1996).
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not been installed. Nonetheless, the mechanics tagged these
generators as unserviceable (which prevented them from being
reinstalled on an aircraft), took what they believed were
equivalent safety measures to render the generators safe, and
sent the generators to the Valujet hold area of the facility for
disposition. Unbeknownst to the mechanics, the generators
were later returned to the Valujet ramp area by a shipping and
receiving clerk who mistakenly believed that the generators were
empty. In charging SabreTech, the government was essentially
charging that this fact pattern constituted the willful placement
of a destructive device on an airplane. While the jury acquitted
the company of this charge, the fact that the government actu-
ally charged this as a crime is a strong indication of how dramat-
ically the enforcement landscape has changed.
B. THE ASSERTION OF GENERAL POLICE POWER UNDER STATE
AND LOCAL LAW
Perhaps the clearest indication of the changing terrain was
the State of Florida's decision to charge SabreTech with felony
murder and manslaughter. The State of Florida announced this
decision at a joint press conference on the same day the federal
government brought charges against SabreTech. While the effi-
cacy of the decision to charge remains to be seen, nothing pre-
vents other states from leveling similar charges in the future if
they believe the situation warrants criminal prosecution.
At least thirty-five states have enacted statutes addressing the
operation of an aircraft in either a reckless manner or while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs.46 While most state stat-
utes are either a generic "reckless flying" statute or only involve
drug or alcohol use, not all statutes are so general in scope.47
46 Ward v. State, 374 A.2d 1118 (Md. 1977) (summarizing 29 states whose laws
dealt with reckless operation of an aircraft or while under the influence of alco-
hol or drugs and six states whose laws dealt only with operation of an aircraft
under the influence of alcohol or drugs). In Ward, one such state reckless flying
statute was used to prosecute and convict a pilot who had buzzed a hotel. Id. at
1126.
47 For example, the Texas statute specifically prohibits taking off or landing on
a road except in an emergency. Jamey Holmes, Is the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion "Kicking the Dog": Pilot Disciplinary Proceedings and the Self Incrimination Privilege,
57J. AIR L. & COM. 297, 301 n.29 (citing Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 46f-1 (West
Supp. 1991)). Criminal prosecution for violation of state statutes has also been
sought where the pilot was not in possession of his airman's license and did not
present it to local law enforcement officers. State v. Collins, 480 N.E.2d 1132
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It is troublesome when state laws are the basis for prosecuting
aviation professionals when the laws allegedly violated were not
originally passed for governing the conduct of the aviation com-
munity. The earliest examples are prosecutions of pilots under
local motor vehicle statutes, based upon analogies drawn by lo-
cal officials between aircraft and motor vehicles.48 One early
case claimed that the state's regulation of this "new form of
transportation through its police power is not substantially dif-
ferent from that of regulating the manner of driving
automobiles.""
Charges more serious than simple infractions of a motor vehi-
cle code have also been directed against pilots under state law.
In State v. Bah " ' and Pritchett v. State,51 for instance, courts up-
held manslaughter convictions of two pilots.
Bahl involved a flight taken by the defendant and a friend fol-
lowing an afternoon spent in three different drinking establish-
ments.52 During the flight, the aircraft struck a power line,
resulting in the crash of the aircraft and the death of the passen-
ger.53 The pilot was found guilty of manslaughter by the district
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984). This case also raised the issue of preemption in the con-
text of the federal licensing regulatory scheme.
48 Jones, supra note 5, at 10; See, e.g., McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25
(1931) (Holmes, J., construing National Motor Vehicle Theft Act as inapplicable
to a case where aircraft was stolen). The analogy between aircraft and motor
vehicles has also been used in other nations. See, e.g., N.D. Price, LEGAL IMPLICA-
TIONS, IN PILOT ERROR, 198, 236 (Ronald Hurst ed., 1976) (noting analogy be-
tween British Air Navigation Order and the British Road Traffic Act).
49 People v. Agnew, 113 P.2d 424, 426 (Colo. 1941). These analogies continue
to the present day. During the recent arrest of the Northwest pilots for operating
an aircraft while under the influence of alcohol, the FAA aviation inspector used
an Implied Consent Advisory form provided by the Minneapolis police officer
that had been modified by the officer by "substituting 'aircraft' for 'motor vehi-
cle' and 'fly' for 'drive."' United States v. Prouse, 945 F.2d 1017, 1021 n.2 (8th
Cir. 1991). For an extensive example of the Iowa State Supreme Court analogiz-
ing between interpretation of motor vehicle statutes and aircraft statutes, See State
v. Bahl, 242 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976).
Further evidence that the motor vehicle analogy continues today was highlighted
in 1989 when the New York district attorney convened a grand jury to look into
the crash of USAir 5050. Noting that an aircraft was considered a vehicle under
New York state law, the district attorney instructed the grand jury to consider
charges of negligent homicide, vehicular manslaughter and leaving the scene of
an accident. Donna St. George, Grand Jury To Mull USAir Case, PHILADELPHIA IN-
QUIRER, Sept. 26, 1989, at A15.
50 Bahl, 242 N.W.2d at 304.
51 414 So. 2d 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.).
52 Bahl, 242 N.W.2d at 299.
53 Id.
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court.54 The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding
that the pilot violated state law by operating his aircraft in a
reckless manner, while under the influence of alcohol.55 The
facts of Pritchett v. State, another death case, are similar. In
Pritchett, the appellate court upheld a manslaughter conviction
due to eyewitness testimony that the pilot flew approximately
forty to fifty feet above the ground over a populated motel and
had to pull up to avoid contacting nearby trees.56
Local municipalities have also attempted to regulate activity
within the aviation field. 57 The ability of a municipality to enact
local zoning laws to regulate the placement and operation of
airfields has been justified when local laws did not conflict with
state regulations. 58 Likewise, the authority to regulate aerial ad-
vertising over a municipality has been upheld in a case where an
airman was convicted of a violation of a municipal ordinance,
even though the aircraft and pilot "complied fully with all re-
quirements" of federal and state regulations. 59
Finally, numerous attempts by local officials to implement air-
craft noise abatement regulations have met with a limited de-
gree of success.6" Municipalities have been consistently
prevented from enforcing laws that attempt to regulate airspace
or imposing requirements for airmen to maintain certain mini-
mum altitudes on federal preemption or constitutional
grounds.61
54 Id. at 298.
55 Jones, supra note 5, at 9.
56 Pritchett, 414 So.2d at 2.
57 See, e.g., infra note 60 and accompanying text (Denver police wrote a ticket
citing B-737 pilots for violation of municipal ordinance prohibiting taxiing air-
craft with flaps up).
58 Garden State Farms, Inc. v. Bay, 370 A.2d 37, 39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977).
59 Tatum, 71 So.2d at 496.
6 E.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 627
(1973); see also American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hemptstead, 398 F.2d 369 (2d
Cir. 1968) (invalidating noise ordinance held where it conflicted with federal
regulation). This can be distinguished from local authority when acting as the
proprietor of an airport. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. at 635 n.14; See, e.g.,
National Aviation v. Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (allowing an
ordinance to stand that imposes a curfew on air traffic exceeding specified noise
level and provides criminal penalties for such action); Santa Monica Airport
Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding an airport
noise reduction ordinance as valid).
61 Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir.
1956).
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III. CONCURRENT AGENCY JURISDICTION
The issue of government agency jurisdiction arises with re-
spect to both civil and public aircraft accident investigations.
Concurrent investigations are common. One investigating
agency focuses on the basic factual inquiry of the accident while
another agency searches for evidence of safety violations that
would warrant disciplinary action. Yet another agency investi-
gates possible criminal culpability. Which agency has the pri-
mary authority over the investigation is always an important
issue.
A. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
In the United States, the investigation of an aircraft accident
often involves several federal authorities.12 Congress has desig-
nated the task of investigating aircraft accidents63 and "re-
port[ing] the facts, circumstances and cause or probable cause
of" the accident to the NTSB."4 The FAA also investigates air-
craft accidents and incidents because Congress conferred upon
the FAA jurisdiction over aviation professionals, other than mili-
tary pilots. 65 Congress has directed the FAA to implement" and
enforce"7 a comprehensive regulatory scheme designed to pro-
mote aviation safety."8 Additionally, the FAA either participates
in the NTSB's investigation or, by delegation, conducts the fact-
(" Although accidents involving military aircraft are not the focus of this paper,
it should be noted that appropriate military authorities conduct (or participate
in) investigations involving military aircraft. See 49 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B) and
(d) (1996).
63 49 U.S.C.A. § 1131(a)(2) (1996)(formerly 49 U.S.C.A. app. § 1441(a)).
d4 i.at § 1131(a)(1) (formerly 49 U.S.C.A. app. § 1441(a)(2)).
65 Id. at § 46101(b).
66 Id. at § 44701 (a) (2). For a discussion of the original creation of the FAA as
directed by the Federal Aviation Act, see Greg Daniel Martin, Enforcement of Federal
Aviation Regulations by the Federal Aviation Administration, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 543
(1987).
67 Id. at § 46106 (West 1994) (granting authority to bring civil actions to en-
force a regulation, order, or term of a certificate or permit).
68 Enforcement actions by the FAA may be administrative or legal. See 14
C.F.R. Pt. 13 (addressing administrative actions in Subpart B and legal enforce-
ment actions in Subpart C). Purely administrative action may involve the issu-
ance of a warning notice or letter of correction, Compliance and Enforcement
Program FAA Order 2150.3A, at 126. Legal enforcement action may include civil
penalties, 49 U.S.C. § 46301 (c) (2), civil actions, 49 U.S.C. § 46106, certificate ac-
tions (authorizing Administrator to "issue an order amending, modifying, sus-
pending, or revoking" any certificate), 49 U.S.C. § 44709, and criminal sanctions,
49 U.S.C. § 46316 (providing for general criminal penalties in certain instances).
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finding for the Board.6 9 Further, federal criminal authorities,
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), may also
investigate an accident.
The concurrent jurisdiction of federal agencies increases the
likelihood of parallel investigations of an accident by both crimi-
nal and civil authorities. These parallel investigations lead to
complications in determining which agency has the primary au-
thority over the accident investigation. Such complications be-
came apparent during the investigation into the TWA 800
accident in 1996.70
The FBI played a major role in the TWA 800 investigation and
rightfully explored the possibility of a criminal act of terrorism
or unintentional missile shoot-down as the cause of the crash.
The FBI's involvement, and the "veil of secrecy" introduced by
the law enforcement agencies, however, led some experts to be
concerned that the NTSB (due to its accountability to the pub-
lic) had to divert significant time and resources to eliminate
these possibilities.7 '
In response to these concerns, Congress clarified the relation-
ship between the NTSB and the FBI in the NTSB Amendments
Act of 2000.72 As codified, the statute authorizes the FBI to as-
sume primary authority over investigations, only in circum-
stances in which the "Attorney General, in consultation with the
Chairman [of the NTSB], determines and notifies the [NTSB]
that circumstances reasonably indicate that the accident may
have been caused by an intentional criminal act."'73 In other
69 49 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (although the FAA is expressly forbidden from partici-
pating in the process of establishing probable cause). For the delegation to the
FAA to investigate accidents, see 49 C.F.R. App. to Part 800.
70 The DOJ addresses the coordination of parallel criminal, civil, and adminis-
trative proceedings in the U.S. Attorney's Manual (USAM). USAM 1-12.00.
71 See Criminalization of Aircraft Accidents, supra note 6 and 35.
72 NTSB Amendments Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-424, eff. Nov. 1, 2000.
73 49 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2) (B) (emphasis added). Annex 13 has a similar stan-
dard addressing the sharing of information gathered in an accident investigation
with enforcement authorities: "The State conducting the investigation of an acci-
dent or incident, wherever it occurred, shall not make [certain records] available
for purposes other than the accident or incident investigation, unless the appro-
priate authority for the administration of justice in that State determines that
their disclosure outweighs the adverse domestic and international impact such
action may have on that or any future investigations." Annex 13 to the Conven-
tion on International Civil Aviation, Std. 5.12. For additional discussion about
the interaction between police investigations and civil litigation under Annex 13,
see Mark Franklin, Air Law Lecture, given at Royal Aeronautical Society, Cyprus
Branch, Nicosia, Cyprus, May 27, 1998.
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cases, the NTSB retains priority over other departments and
agencies of the United States Government in the investigation
of civil or public aircraft accidents.
B. STATE AND LOCAL
A number of criminal prosecutions of aviation professionals
have been conducted under state laws. Most assertions of crimi-
nal jurisdiction by the states have been in non-commercial set-
tings."4 Such prosecutions have been undertaken typically in
cases involving loss of life, resulting in charges of
manslaughter.7
5
State or local law enforcement authorities usually assert juris-
diction over aviation matters when the incident was accompa-
nied by aggravating circumstances such as drunkenness.76 An
exception to this generalization occurred in California, when
the Los Angeles City Attorney's office utilized the State's "reck-
less flying statute" to impose penalties for violations of Class B
Airspace7 7 within the city limits. 78 This aggressive pursuit of avia-
tors for relatively minor infractions was challenged by the FAA
on grounds that parallel investigations of private pilots by the
City Attorney would hinder the federal investigation by deter-
ring the pilots from cooperating with FAA officials. 9 The City
Attorney eventually dropped the Class B incursion investigations
in order to resolve this dispute.80
74 See, e.g., People v. Valenti, 200 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1984) (affirming conviction for reckless flying in and around Oxnard, Calif.);
Pritchett v. State, 414 So. 2d 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming manslaughter
conviction for death of only passenger on recreational flight); Ward v. State, 374
A.2d at 1118 (Md. 1977) (conviction for reckless flying after "buzzing" apartment
buildings); State v. Bahl, 242 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976) (convicted of manslaughter
for flying aircraft while intoxicated during recreational flight).
75 See, e.g., Pritchett, 414 So. 2d at 2 (affirming manslaughter conviction); Bahl,
242 N.W.2d at 298 (convicted of manslaughter for flying aircraft while intoxi-
cated during recreational flight).
76 E.g., Ward, 374 A.2d at 1118 (conviction for reckless flying after "buzzing"
apartment buildings while intoxicated).
77 14 C.F.R. § 71.41 (formerly known as "Terminal Control Area").
78 Malnic, supra note 14, at 1.
79 Jack Jones, Veteran Pilot Accused of Reckless Stunt Flying, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26,
1987, at 6.
80 Id. Less than one month later, however, the City Attorney's office pursued
criminal misdemeanor charges based on the state reckless flying statutes in a case
involving a stunt pilot who allegedly "performed stunts too close to a commuter
airliner." Id. The City Attorney, Mr. Hahn, distinguished the pursuit of this viola-
tion from the earlier TCA incursions, characterizing the new case as typical of
cases his office has traditionally pursued. Id. The FAA acquiesced to some de-
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Until 1989, there had not been a serious attempt to investi-
gate potential criminal liability of a commercial aviator in this
country. This tradition nearly ended when the New York Dis-
trict Attorney convened a grand jury to determine if criminal
charges should be filed following the 1989 crash of USAir Flight
5050 into the East River during an aborted takeoff from LaGuar-
dia Airport.81 The District Attorney is reported to have taken
this unusual action because he was dissatisfied with the federal
investigation, because federal investigators, in keeping with the
procedures normally used during the early stages of the investi-
gation, had not placed the pilots under oath during their ques-
tioning. 2 Even after the grand jury had determined that no
criminal charges were appropriate, the District Attorney stated
he would continue to pursue the matter (including interviewing
the Captain of the flight and listening to the cockpit voice re-
corder) before abandoning his criminal investigation. 3
In so doing, the New York District Attorney became the first
local official to challenge the traditional primacy84 of the NTSB
investigation. Indeed, one of his first on-scene actions was to
gree, agreeing to work "in the spirit of cooperation and the principle of com-
ity... in the criminal prosecution of aggravated violations such as drunk flying,
very low beach buzzing and the like." Id.
81 St. George, supra note 49, at A15; Leonard Levitt & Joseph W. Queen, The
LaGuardia Crash Queens DA Wants Own Crash Probe, NEWSDAY, Sept. 24, 1989, at 5.
Because an airplane is considered a vehicle under New York law, the grand was
allowed to consider such charges as negligent homicide, vehicular manslaughter
or leaving the scene of an accident. The prosecutor's response to the crash of
USAir 5050 was a startling departure from the typical response to prior investiga-
tions. As a result, the Air Line Pilots Association completely revamped their post-
accident representation procedures. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 8.
82 Levitt & Queen, supra note 81, at 5.
83 Wendy Lin and Beth Holland, DA Says Flight "Clean", Newsday, Oct. 6, 1989,
at 19.
84 Many state statutes explicitly provide for the primacy of the federal investiga-
tion. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 02.15.050(c) (West 1993) (evidence of aviation acci-
dent shall be preserved "until the federal agency institutes an investigation");
Ind. Code Ann. § 8-21-1-8(o) (West 1994) (directing local agencies to comply
with state rules "until representatives of appropriate federal agencies arrive on
the site"); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 6, § 17 (West 1993) (1991 amendment requires
department to assist NTSB rather than conduct its own investigation). Other
states are not as clear regarding the level of cooperation with the NTSB. See, e.g.,
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15-71a (West 1994) (authorizing, but not requiring state
commissioner to accept federal report in lieu of conducting his own "detailed
investigation"); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 41 (West 1994) (authority for
state investigation of aircraft accidents may be exercised jointly with federal
agency); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4561.06 (Anderson 1993) (state department
"may cooperate" with federal agency).
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threaten to "cordon off' the area as a crime scene and refuse to
allow the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) to examine the
wreckage.85 The NTSB considered this move unprecedented.
The FAA declared the criminal probe a "radical departure from
the usual practice," especially because the NTSB never uncov-
ered any evidence of criminal activity during the entire course
of its investigation.86
The rarity of such intrusions by local officials into the investi-
gative process caused one NTSB official to comment that he was
aware of only three prior occasions in which local law enforce-
ment officials had ever become involved in an accident investi-
gation.87 In these cases local law enforcement officials never
challenged the FAA or NTSB's jurisdiction over the accident
scene.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS ON
AVIATION SAFETY
The SabreTech prosecution highlights the issues raised when
criminal law is used to advance aviation safety. The facts under-
lying the SabreTech prosecution are critical to understand the
impact.
A. THE SABRETECH PROSECUTION
On May 11, 1996, ValuJet Flight 592 departed Miami Interna-
tional Airport, carrying 110 passengers and crew, and crashed
into the Florida Everglades, leaving no survivors. Immediately,
teams from the NTSB and the FAA descended upon the Ever-
glades to investigate the cause of the accident. Within days, it
became apparent that the most likely cause of the disaster was a
fire in the cargo hold fueled by oxygen generators that were
placed aboard the aircraft as COMAT (Company Owned Materi-
als). The oxygen generators had been removed from three
85 Wendy Lin, Santucci Takes Charge of USAirJet Crash Probe, Newsday, Sept. 26,
1989 at 6.
86 Id. at 6. Additionally, the NTSB said, in referring to the local prosecutor's
concurrent criminal investigation, "We don't have any indication of criminal
activity."
87 Jd. All three cases involved the element of intent associated with the action:
(i) autopsy of dead commuter pilot indicated cocaine in system, (ii) disgruntled
employee shot both pilots, resulting in accident killing everyone on board, and
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ValuJet-MD 80s, which had recently been modified at
SabreTech's maintenance facility in Miami.
Shortly after the crash, NTSB and FAA investigators inter-
viewed several SabreTech mechanics and employees. These in-
terviews took place before some of the witnesses consulted an
attorney. This procedure became particularly troublesome be-
cause both federal and state law enforcement authorities were
investigating the accident, and ValuJet, SabreTech and many of
their employees were the subjects of criminal investigations.
The employee interviews revealed that SabreTech mechanics
had removed the oxygen generators from three Valujet MD-80s
months before the crash. Although the work cards indicated to
the mechanics the generators became hot when initiated, there
were no hazardous materials labels or other warnings on the
generators to alert the mechanics to these hidden dangers. The
mechanics had no safety caps for the generators, therefore, they
tightly wound the generator lanyards through the firing pins to
prevent accidental ignition, and taped the ends to the generator
bodies. Despite the lack of safety caps on the generators, the
mechanics signed the removal and installation workcards indi-
cating that safety caps, in fact, had been installed. The mechan-
ics properly tagged the generators as unserviceable and "out of
date," and took them to the Valujet hold area of the SabreTech
facility. The mechanics, who never saw the generators again, be-
lieved they were to be discarded, not shipped.
Later, without the knowledge of the mechanics, a SabreTech
shipping clerk, believing the generators were empty, boxed
them for return to Valujet. Because he did not know these parts
constituted hazardous materials, the clerk did not comply with
the hazardous materials labeling, packaging and shipping regu-
lations. A different SabreTech employee returned the boxed
generators, along with other parts, to Valujet, who placed the
boxes aboard Flight 592. The NTSB found that these genera-
tors were the primary contributing cause of the fire that brought
the plane down.
Following discovery of the erroneous paperwork, the FBI exe-
cuted a search warrant at SabreTech's facility and served wide-
ranging grand jury subpoenas on both SabreTech and Valujet.
The government received hundreds of thousands of pages of
maintenance and other business records. SabreTech, its execu-
tives, and other company employees found themselves under
the government microscope. At one point, Metro-Dade police
officers posted themselves outside the gates of SabreTech's busi-
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ness offices in an attempt to interview employees on their way to
and from work. In addition, FBI agents and state law enforce-
ment officials visited employees at their homes at night and on
weekends in an attempt to interview them. Representatives of
the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida,
the FBI, and the Metro-Dade (Miami) Police were provided
their own table at the NTSB hearings into the Valujet crash.
In July 1999, the United States Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of Florida returned a twenty-four count indict-
ment, charging SabreTech and three of its mechanics with con-
spiring to falsify aircraft records, falsifying aircraft records,
violating hazardous materials regulations, and placing a destruc-
tive device aboard an airplane. At the same time, the State At-
torney for Miami-Dade County Florida, charged SabreTech with
220 counts of felony murder and manslaughter and an environ-
mental offense.
In December 1999, after a three-week federal trial, SabreTech
and its mechanics were acquitted of the conspiracy charges, the
false statements charges, the willful hazardous materials charges,
and the destructive device charge. The company, however, was
convicted of eight counts of recklessly violating the hazardous
materials regulation and one count of failing properly to train
its employees in the recognition of hazardous materials. The
judge imposed a $2 million fine on SabreTech, and ordered res-
titution in excess of $9 million.
On November 7, 2001, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed SabreTech's convictions on the eight counts of reckless
violation of HAZMAT regulations, holding that the charges were
not properly authorized by law.89 The appellate court also set
aside a lower court order granting restitution and, at resentenc-
ing, extinguished approximately $1.5 million of the $2 million
fine imposed by the lower court."
89 United States v. SabreTech, Inc., 271 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2001).
'10 Upon receiving the maximum $ 500,000 fine at resentencing, Sabre Tech
once again filed an appeal based on its poor financial condition. This appeal is
pending at the time of publication.
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B. THE EFFECT OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION ON FUTURE NTSB
INVESTIGATIONS-THE PROBLEM
OF SELF-INCRIMINATION
Safety investigations are primarily undertaken to determine
the accident's cause to prevent future accidents.9 ' This goal re-
quires the free flow of information from all possible sources, in-
cluding participants and witnesses.1 2  When criminal
investigations are conducted concurrent with (or even as part
of) accident investigations, however, conflicting interests arise,
particularly with respect to the use of the evidence. The concur-
rent investigation may deter potential witnesses from cooperat-
ing in the accident investigation because of a legitimate concern
that their testimony could be used against them in a criminal
prosecution. Indeed, the United States Air Force has adopted a
safety program in which Safety Investigation Board ("SIB") in-
vestigators may grant to witnesses a promise of confidentiality.
This promise helps SIB investigators obtain information pertain-
ing to an aircraft mishap for the purpose of assessing matters of
safety, combat readiness, and mission accomplishment.9 3 Under
this policy, the Air Force promises confidentiality to crew mem-
91 This is the purpose behind investigations of the NTSB and Annex 13 investi-
gations in other countries. See Convention on International Civil Aviation pmbl.,
Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693, 15 U.N.T.S. 296 ("that international civil aviation
may be developed in a safe and orderly manner"); Michael Milde, Aircraft Accident
Investigation in International Law, 9 AIR LAw 61, 63 (1984) (standard 3.1 to Annex
13) ("It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability."); see also
Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents) Regulations 1989 (Eng.), art. 4
("The fundamental purpose of investigating accidents under these Regulations
shall be to determine the circumstances and causes of the accident with a view to
the preservation of life and the avoidance of accidents in the future; it is not the
purpose to apportion blame or liability."), reprinted in SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT:
AIR LAw vol. 2, C 1621 (4th ed. 1994).
92 This was well expressed in the military context, "[t]he success of the [flight
safety] program depends in large part on the ability of the investigators to get full
information on the cause of any accident." Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 339
(D.C. Cir. 1963) (summarizing Inspector General of the Air Force); see also
Cooper v. Dep't of the Navy of the United States, 558 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir.
1977) (noting that the success of an investigation is dependent on "disclosures
against interest" obtained through appeal made to "witnesses' concern for the
safety of others").
"If the investigators were unable to give such assurances, testimony in many in-
stances would be less than fully factual and the determination of the exact causa-
tive factors would be jeopardized." Machin, 316 F.2d 336 at 339 (summarizing
the Inspector General of the Air Force).
93 Air Force Instruction ("AFI") 91-204, Safety Investigations and Reports, May 22,
2001, paragraphs E.4.4.2.2, DoDI 6055.7; paragraph 1.1.1.1, AFI 91-204.
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bers, aircraft mechanics, supervisors, and other witnesses and
technical experts who have knowledge of the accident.
In return for the free, unfettered testimony of these witnesses,
the Air Force has agreed that the testimony may be used for
mishap prevention purposes only, and may not be used in any
disciplinary or criminal proceedings, or other administrative ac-
tions. Air Force Instruction 91-204, however, does provide an
exception in the case of false testimony or investigative miscon-
duct, "or to comply with a valid court order on behalf of a defen-
dant in a criminal trial."94 Relying on the "military safety
privilege," the military services consistently have withheld from
the public certain safety information contained in its investiga-
tion reports. The military safety privilege continues to be an es-
sential element in the Air Force's safety program.95
The promise of confidentiality granted to witnesses by the
United States Air Force in its investigation of aviation mishaps
serves to encourage frank and open communications to individ-
uals who provide witness statements to an investigating officer,
and to government contractors involved in the design, construc-
tion, or maintenance of the aircraft or component parts.9" Vari-
ous courts have recognized the salutary purpose of the military
safety privilege. In the case of Machin v. Zuckert,97 the Washing-
ton, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals considered a claim of govern-
mental privilege asserted by the Secretary of the Air Force in
connection with the investigation of a B-25 bomber crash on
May 17, 1956. Moments prior to the crash, the pilot of the air-
craft reported a propeller over speed. The only surviving crew
member aboard the accident aircraft, Mr. Machin, filed a lawsuit
against the manufacturer of the propeller and served a sub-
poena upon the Air Force for a copy of its privileged safety re-
port. The Air Force was successful in quashing the subpoena
based upon its claim of executive privilege with respect to wit-
ness statements contained in the report given under a promise
of confidentiality. The appellate court affirmed the lower court
ruling regarding the privileged witness statements, and ordered
94 AFI 91-204, figure 2.6.
95 For a comprehensive review and analysis of the military safety privilege, see
Paul E. Cormier, The Mililamy Safety Privilege and Accountability: Are They Compatible?,
presented at the 3 6 " Annual SMU Air Law Symposium Journal of Air Law and
Commerce, Dallas, Texas, March 1, 2002.
,16 Paragraph 2.1.2.3, AFT 91-204, Promise of Confidentiality.
97 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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only the factual information contained within the report must
be released. In its opinion, the court stated that:
[W]e agree with the government that when disclosure of investi-
gative reports obtained in large part through promises of confi-
dentiality would hamper the efficient operation of an important
government program and perhaps even, as the Secretary here
claims, impair the national security by weakening a branch of the
military, the reports should be considered privileged.98
Other courts have considered the validity of the "Machin priv-
ilege" and have consistently upheld the confidentiality of witness
statements provided to safety investigators. 9
In the context of criminal proceedings, including court-mar-
tial, the Department of Defense has recognized the competing
interests of the United States' goal to quickly determine the
cause of an accident and the public's demand to hold individ-
ual's personally accountable for their misdeeds. In recognition
of these competing interests, the Defense Department revised its
Instruction 6055.7 on October 3, 2000, to allow the release of
privileged safety information only under exceptional
circumstances. '
98 Id. at 339.
99 Rabbitt v. Dep't of Air Force, 401 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.NXY. 1974) (witness
statements provided to a safety investigator are not subject to disclosure under
FOIA); United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792 (1984) (confidential
witness statements are intra-agency memoranda within the meaning of the FOIA,
and are therefore not discoverable under exemption 5 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (5)); see also Badhwar v. Dep't of Air Force, 829 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(upholding the lower court's order of nondisclosure of statements provided by
third-party witnesses to the military Accident Investigation Board).
100 E4.5.3.3.2, of DoDI 6055.7 states:
For all investigations where safety investigators are authorized to
grant promises of confidentiality, including investigations of flight
and flight-related accidents ... the Secretary of the Military Depart-
ment ... shall assert the privilege to oppose any court-ordered re-
lease of privileged safety information. If a Secretary of a Military
Department determines that exceptional circumstances warrant re-
lease of privileged safety information, the Secretary may request the
DUSD(ES) to permit the selective release of such information. The
request must include certification by the Secretary of the Military
Department that the purposes to be served are compelling and
solely related to safety and the interests of safety are better served
by release. When the DUSD(ES) . . . after consultation with the
individual Secretaries of the Military Departments, determines that
the interests of safety are better served, the DUSD(ES) may permit
the selective use of privileged safety information in exceptional
circumstances.
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The NTSB has also encountered this problem, when numer-
ous witnesses refused to provide information to NTSB investiga-
tors in connection with a pipeline explosion in Bellingham,
Washington."'0 Of course, there is no provision of civil or crimi-
nal law similar to DoDI 6055.7 available to protect statements
given by witnesses with knowledge of facts surrounding civil air-
craft accidents.
The reticence of witnesses to disclose information may result
in error reporting by those individuals who provide testimony
and may ultimately impede an investigation. Approximately sev-
enty-five per cent of aircraft accidents in the United States in-
volve some form of human error."2 Thus, the potential for
losing the cooperation of individuals who feel they may face
criminal accusations is very real.
The conflict is even more significant when FAA employees are
involved in the investigation. The FARs direct FAA employees
to report any suspected violation of a criminal provision of the
Federal Aviation Act or HMTA to the FAA's legal department. If
appropriate, the FAA's legal department forwards the report to
the Department of Justice (DOJ) for criminal prosecution."0 3
1. Evidentiary Sources of Potential Self-Incrimination
In addition to the testimonial evidence of witnesses, an inves-
tigation into an accident may yield many types of evidence that
are important to criminal prosecutors. The NTSB's final factual
report and probable cause summary, as well as cockpit voice re-
corder and flight data recorder information may be a source of
such evidence. 10 4
Special statutory guidelines apply to the use of cockpit voice
recorder and flight data recorder information. The NTSB has
initial control over the cockpit voice recorder and flight data
recorder and is precluded from publicly disclosing any part of
the cockpit voice recorder if it is relevant to the accident or inci-
101 Testimony of Marshall Filler before the House Subcommittee on Aviation,
July 27, 2000.
102 Inside FAA-September 15, 2000, p. 11.
103 14 C.F.R. § 13.23(b) (2002). Although FAR § 13.23 still refers to the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, that Act was recodified in 1994 into Title 49, effective July 5,
1994.
104 While FAR § 121.359 prohibits the use of information from the CVR in an
FAA enforcement action, the grand jury used the CVR in connection with its
investigation into SabreTech and its employees.
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dent.1 15 A transcript of any relevant part may be made public at
the time when the majority of the report is made public. 10 6 Pro-
visions are in place for the discovery of cockpit voice recorder
transcripts10 7 or recordings' 08 and for parts not available to the
public if required for a fair trial.0 9 If the cockpit voice recorder
products are used for discovery, the court is required to take
steps to prevent the public release of information.'' Further,
the FAA is precluded from the use of information from the
cockpit voice recorder in cases seeking the punitive sanction of
pilots in civil or certificate sanctions."'
2. The Impact of the Fifth Amendment
The use of testimonial evidence acquired after an accident
will almost certainly raise constitutional issues of self-incrimina-
tion. In the United States, the Fifth Amendment right to refuse
to provide evidence which may be self-incriminating does not
necessarily apply in every case in which an accident investigation
is conducted." 2 The Fifth Amendment specifically affords pro-
tection in criminal actions." 3 Nevertheless, established tradi-
tion has afforded a liberal interpretation of its provisions," 4 and
105 49 U.S.C. § 1114(c) (2002). The potential use of the cockpit voice recorder
and the release of information contained on it is addressed in 49 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1114, 1154.
106 Id. § 1114(c) (B).
107 Id. § 1154(a) (2).
108 Id. § 1154(a) (3).
l0 Id. §§ 1154(a) (2) (A), (a)(3)(A).
110 Id. § 1154(a) (4) (A).
III "The Administrator does not use the record in any civil or certificate ac-
tion." 14 C.F.R. § 121.359 (1994); 14 C.F.R. § 135.151 (1994).
Despite these restrictions, the intent of which is to increase the free flow of infor-
mation in the aftermath of an aircraft accident, the information in the cockpit
voice recorder has been sought by at least one district attorney in the pursuit of
his criminal investigation. See, e.g., Grand Juy Probing USAir Crash Finds No Evi-
dence of Criminality, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1989, at 19 (District Attorney in New York
attempts to get cockpit voice recorder from NTSB in aftermath of crash of USAir
5050); Lin Holland, supra note 83, at 19. The counsel for SabreTech, Martin
Raskin, indicates that the grand jury investigating the ValuJet 592 accident was
able to read the transcript of the CVR.
112 Although individual officers and directors of a corporation have the right
to invoke Fifth Amendment protections, George Campbell Painting Corp.v. Reid,
392 U.S. 286, 289 (1968), corporations themselves do not have the right to this
same constitutional protection Branswell v. United States, 487 U.S.99 (1988).
113 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself").
114 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). Justice Marshall would
afford an even more liberal interpretation than that currently utilized, "The Fifth
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Fifth Amendment protection has been extended to include civil
cases where "the answer might tend to subject to criminal re-
sponsibility him who gives it."1"5
In the aviation context, courts are reluctant to grant Fifth
Amendment protections to airmen in civil settings unless there
is a "substantial and real" possibility of future criminal prosecu-
tion."' This ignores, however, the regulatory requirement that
the FAA pass to the DOJ any information regarding potential
criminal violations,1 7 and the DOJ may then use the results of
an FAA investigation in subsequent prosecutions of airmen. 8
The reluctance to grant Fifth Amendment protections to indi-
viduals testifying in a civil setting ignores the possibility that the
testimony itself may provide the foundation for subsequent
criminal actions. Thus, airmen may be compelled to give infor-
mation to government officials who are, in turn, required to re-
port criminal conduct to prosecutors. Such testimony may be
required without Fifth Amendment guarantees or even a Mi-
Amendment privilege against coerced self-incrimination extends to every means
of government information gathering." Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. In-
terest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 866 (1984) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (citing
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)).
115 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
16 Roach v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 804 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (10th Cir.
1986). This right does not preclude the compelling of a witness to testify at ad-
ministrative hearings when there is not "reasonable cause to apprehend danger
from a direct answer." Id. at 1151. This is distinguished from the right of a wit-
ness to not take the stand at his own criminal trial, which is absolute. Id. at 1150.
A strong argument can be made that certificate action by itself, even in the ab-
sence of criminal proceedings, should raise Fifth Amendment protections. See
Holmes, supra note 47, at 330 (arguing that the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination should be extended to pilots facing decertification). The Fifth
Amendment protection was found to extend to a lawyer in a disbarment hearing,
noting that when the nature of civil penalties begins to appear very similar to
criminal penalties, Fifth Amendment protections may apply. Spevack v. Klein,
385 U.S. 511, 514 (1967) (holding that disbarment could not be a penalty for
failure to testify-"[T]he Fifth Amendment... should not be watered down by
imposing... the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it."). The case
notes that the penalties against which the Fifth Amendment protects extend to
"any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 'costly."'
Id. at 515; see also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (holding that asser-
tion of Fifth Amendment was not grounds for forfeiture of jobs as police
officers).
117 14 C.F.R. § 13.23(b) (2002). See, e.g., Calonius, supra note 17 at 85 (FAA
inspector took case to U.S. Attorney).
118 Martin, supra note 66, at 562.
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randa warning because the accused is not in custody at the time
of testifying.' 19
The duty to provide testimony without first receiving the tradi-
tional protections from its possible use in criminal proceedings
may engender a healthy skepticism in those who are asked to
provide such testimony. Concerns over the effect of criminal
prosecution on the cooperation received by safety investigators
were at the heart of Admiral Engen's concern that pilots will not
cooperate in investigations if they think the information pro-
vided to safety investigators could be used "by other parties in a
criminal prosecution."120
C. IMMUNITY
1. Background on Criminal Immunity
Often in a criminal investigation, only a grant of immunity
can persuade a witness to share what he knows with investiga-
tors. There are two general types of immunity which may be
offered-transactional immunity and use immunity. Transac-
tional immunity protects an individual from prosecution for any
conduct addressed in his testimony. Use immunity, or "deriva-
tive use immunity" as it is sometimes called, prohibits prosecu-
tors from using both the immunized testimony of a witness, and
any leads to additional incriminating evidence against the wit-
ness which may be developed through that testimony, in a subse-
quent prosecution of that witness.
Immunity is a creature of statute. The federal immunity stat-
ute does not authorize the grant of transactional immunity in a
federal criminal prosecution. Beginning in 1970, transactional
immunity was removed from federal statutes and replaced with
use immunity provisions. 121 The grant of federal immunity is
119 Martin, supra note 66, at 564. For detailing of procedural safeguards not
available to airmen involved in certificate action, see id. at 556-561. For an exam-
ple where the protection against self-incrimination was not addressed in a crimi-
nal forum following testimony given to the FAA, see United States v. Myers, 878
F.2d 1142, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming conviction of pilot for making false
statements to FAA after he had made up a story to explain why he had entered
prohibited airspace surrounding President Reagan's helicopters).
120 Stein, supra note 14 at 1.
121 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (2000). Section 6002 provides that a witness who
has been granted immunity and ordered to testify may not refuse to testify on
self-incrimination grounds. It states as follows:
"no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any infor-
mation directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, ex-
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authorized and enforced by a federal judge issuing a compul-
sion order requiring a witness to testify. It is important to re-
member that a grant of statutory immunity shields individuals
from criminal liability only. It does not afford protection against
civil liability, 122 tax liability,12' disciplinary actions 124 or enforce-
ment proceedings. 121 Moreover, a person who receives use im-
munity still remains subject to criminal prosecution if the
government can show that the evidence upon which the prose-
cution is based was developed through means completely inde-
pendent of the immunized testimony.
A grant of federal immunity is the prerogative of the Execu-
tive Branch of the government. As a general rule, only the At-
torney General or a designated officer of DOJ has authority to
grant use immunity.1 2' 6 Although the statutes provide that an
administrative agency also may issue immunity orders in connec-
tion with agency proceedings, an agency may only do so "with
the approval of the Attorney General." 127
2. Department of Justice Guidelines on the Grant of Immunity
The Department of Justice has published non-binding princi-
ples to serve as guidelines for the exercise of discretion in decid-
ing to grant or deny immunity.' 2 It is the policy of the DOJ to
initiate prosecutions if the government believes that the per-
son's conduct "constitutes a federal offense and that the admissi-
ble evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a
conviction."' 9 Exceptions to this rule are that: (i) no substan-
tial federal interest would be served by prosecution, 130 (ii) the
cept in a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or other-
wise failing to comply with the order." (Emphasis added.)
122 United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir. 1977).
123 Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 541-42 (7th Cir. 1978).
124 In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 474 (7th Cir. 1977).
125 Childs v. Schlitz, 556 F.2d 1178 (4th Cir. 1977); Thomas v. Bible, 694 F.
Supp. 750, 764 (D. Nev. 1988).
12 Pillsbury v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).
127 18 U.S.C. §6004 (a). In re Application of the President's Comm. on Organ-
ized Crime, 763 F. 2d 1191 (11 th Cir. 1885); see also infra note 125 and accompa-
nying text.
128 See USAM Chapter 9-23.000, el seq.
121) USAM 9-27.220.
130 Determining whether prosecution should be declined based on a lack of
substantial federal interest, the attorney for the government should weigh all rel-
evant considerations, including: "1) federal law enforcement priorities; 2) the
nature and seriousness of the offense; 3) the deterrent effect of prosecution; 4)
the person's culpability in connection with the offense; 5) the person's history
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person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdic-
tion,1"1 or (iii) there exists an adequate non-criminal alternative
to prosecution. 13 2 Once a decision to prosecute has been made,
"the attorney for the government should charge ... the most
serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the defen-
dant's conduct, and that is likely to result in a sustainable
conviction."' 33
Prior to granting immunity, the prosecutor first must file an
application with the Criminal Division of the DOJ demonstrat-
ing that: (i) compelling the witness to testify is necessary to the
public interest, and (ii) the person has refused or likely will re-
fuse to testify based on his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.134 The non-exclusive criteria used by the
DOJ to determine whether the public interest standard has been
met are: (a) the seriousness of the offense and the importance
of the case in achieving effective enforcement of the criminal
law; (b) the value of the witness's testimony to the investigation
or prosecution; (c) the likelihood that the witness will comply
promptly with the immunity order and provide useful testimony;
(d) the witness's culpability relative to other possible defend-
ants; (e) the possibility of successfully prosecuting the witness
without immunity; and, (f) the possibility of adverse conse-
quences to the witness if the witness testifies pursuant to a com-
pulsion order. 35
As a practical matter, federal prosecutors are generally reluc-
tant to grant immunity to serious offenders since they know that
the public and potential jurors will look unfavorably upon
highly culpable individuals escaping punishment. Prosecutors
are similarly hesitant to grant immunity at early stages of an in-
with respect to criminal activity; 6) the person's willingness to cooperate in the
investigation and prosecution of others; and the probable sentence or other con-
sequences if the person is convicted." USAM 9-27.230.
131 This criterion requires the attorney for the government to weigh all rele-
vant considerations, including: "1) the strength of the otherjurisdiction's interest
in prosecution; 2) the other jurisdiction's ability and willingness to prosecute ef-
fectively; and 3) the probable sentence or other consequences if the person is
convicted in the other jurisdiction." USAM 9-27.240.
132 In considering the issue of an existing non-criminal alternative to prosecu-
tion, the attorney for the government should weigh all relevant considerations,
including: "the sanctions available under the alternative means of disposition; 2)
the likelihood that an effective sanction will be imposed; and 3) the effect of non-
criminal disposition on federal law enforcement interests." USAM 9-27.250.
133 USAM 9-27.300A.
134 See 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (b) (2000).
135 USAM 9-23.210.
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vestigation since it may be unclear what a particular witnesses'
criminal liability may be.
3. Immunity as a Means of Promoting Aviation Safety
In the post-Valujet era, the NTSB's investigation is frequently
shadowed or even eclipsed by parallel criminal investigations
conducted by the FBI, the FAA, the DOT's Office of Inspector
General, and/or the EPA's Criminal Enforcement Division.
The prudent corporation with close ties to the accident should
deploy its own rapid response team of attorneys and others to
conduct their own investigation into the facts and circumstances
surrounding the accident. Individuals will retain counsel who
will advise their clients to think long and hard before giving tes-
timony to the NTSB that ultimately may be used by government
prosecutors to build a criminal case against them. Indeed, many
criminal lawyers will advise their clients to assert their Fifth
Amendment privilege in order to avoid waiving their Fifth
Amendment rights.
Often, a grant of immunity from prosecution will persuade
such witnesses to furnish the information sought. In the days
and weeks immediately following a major transportation acci-
dent, when the facts surrounding an accident are still sketchy, it
is unlikely that a U.S. Attorney serious about pursuing criminal
charges will be willing to grant such immunity. Indeed, few U.S.
Attorneys, at this early stage, would be willing to disregard the
criteria set by the DOJ for evaluating immunity requests in order
to offer grants of immunity to witnesses whom NTSB believes
may hold the key to the mysteries of probable cause of the acci-
dent. Ironically, this "Catch 22" brings us back to the initial
question of whether or not criminal prosecution is an effective,
necessary, or desirable means of securing safety in the skies.
Surely, if prosecutors are willing to immunize witnesses from
prosecution on any grounds in order to obtain the truth as to
the cause of an accident, then they are basically acknowledging
that the pursuit of truth for purposes of promoting aviation
safety is really the paramount concern in these investigations.
Federal prosecutors have wide discretion in determining when,
whom, how and even whether to prosecute for apparent viola-
tions of federal criminal statutes.1 36
13f See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
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4. The Impact of Prosecutorial Discretion
It is not the prosecutions, in and of themselves, which are the
major concern-it is the investigation which precedes the indict-
ments that have the potential to inhibit the search for truth.
The DOJ's prosecution criteria, the various bar canons of ethics,
and the good faith of most federal prosecutors serve as ample
protection against most unwarranted prosecutions.
Domestically, and in most other countries, the majority of avi-
ation incidents trigger the traditional accident investigations by
aviation authorities, with no concurrent or parallel investigation
into possible criminal liability. If pilots are judged to be at fault,
punishment takes the form of administrative action only.
This, however, does not prevent a zealous prosecutor from at-
tempting to bring the investigation of the incursions into his do-
main, even over FAA objections. The motivational factors
behind local criminal prosecutions are not necessarily consistent
with the federal government's long-term goal of protecting the
flying public. Indeed, a spokesman for the Los Angeles District
Attorney's office declared publicly, "The bottom line is [the Dis-
trict Attorney] has been prosecuting pilots in the past for reck-
less or careless flying and he will continue to do so in the future
with or without the cooperation [of FAA officials]." '
The decision by a prosecutor to pursue criminal charges also
may be fueled by the intense media attention that surrounds an
aviation accident. 3 The slow, deliberate pace at which the
NTSB conducts major accident investigations may not always sat-
isfy the public's thirst for information and action. This, in turn,
137 Stein, supra note 14, at Metro 1.
138 While it is difficult to prove the impact of media attention, criminal prose-
cutions have occurred in instances of high profile accidents. Domestically, for
instance, media attention may have increased the possibility of criminal prosecu-
tion following the helicopter crash during the filming of the movie "The Twilight
Zone." See Kolczynski, supra note 6, at 49 (death of actor and involvement of well
known director led to "media event").
The effect of media attention is not necessarily limited to a "major" aircraft acci-
dent. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 256 P.2d 205, 205 (Okla. Crim. App. 1953) (not-
ing the abandonment of an initial plea bargain after it attracted the attention of
the local media, resulting in a subsequent guilty plea to the charges and a judg-
ment for thirty days in jail and a $100 fine).
Nor is the media attention unique to the United States. One observer of the trial
of the Swissair pilots in Athens specifically said he was "scared by the savage man-
ner of the proceedings. The pilots were ill-treated and made scapegoats. They
were assailed by the press and photographers .... ." Report on 40th Annual
Conference, Montreal, Canada, 29 April-3 May 1985, 10 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L.
487, 489 (1985) (comment made by Regional Vice-President Europe/South).
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may pressure law enforcement agencies to investigate the poten-
tial criminal aspects, even where there is none clearly evident.1"9
Indeed, prosecutors may believe that the prosecution of sensa-
tional cases serves the public interest as a visible demonstration
that the government is taking action in the aftermath of an acci-
dent."' While a public airing of the issues may be essential
where serious harm or loss of life has occurred, prosecutors
nonetheless should resist the urge to yield to the public clamor.
Making a criminal inquiry the vehicle for this public airing may
have detrimental effects that offset any safety benefit to be
gained from the prosecution.
5. Immunity of Aviation Professionals From FAA Enforcement
Actions
In the past, the FAA has been willing to grant aviation profes-
sionals immunity from administrative sanctions in return for in-
formation it believes will improve safety. For instance, in formal
fact-finding investigations conducted by the FAA under an Or-
der of Investigation, the FAA has authority to grant criminal im-
munity (except for perjury) to a witness, with the approval of
the Attorney General. 4 '
For decades, the Aviation Safety Reporting Program (ASRP)
has provided limited immunity from FAA sanctions to pilots,
flight attendants, maintenance personnel, and other users of the
national airspace system who file an Aviation Safety Report
within ten days of an incident or occurrence. 142 The program
encourages individuals to provide information that may prevent
similar future incidents.'43 It does not apply, however, to crimi-
nal activity, aircraft accidents, lack of qualifications or compe-
139 Kolczynski, supra note 6, at 11.
'4' Cf. Mervyn E. Bennun, Prosecuting Professional Pilots in the United Kingdom
after November Oscar: Reflections on the Law and Policy, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 331, 347-
48 (Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996).
141 14 C.F.R. § 13.119(a).
142 Aviation Safety Reporting Program, Advisory Circular 00-46D (Feb. 26,
1997); see also John S. Yodice, The Aviation Safety Reporting System, AOPA PILOT,
July 1994 at 128. Id. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) acts as an independent third party to collect the information and ensure
confidentiality of the reports. It is only after an independent investigation of an
incident by the FAA reveals a violation that the ASRS may be invoked to grant
immunity.
143 Except to the extent that it does not provide protection in cases where
there is an accident or a criminal prosecution, the ASRS is analogous to transac-
tional immunity in that it protects aviators from sanctions regardless of whether
independent evidence could demonstrate the violation. Thus, it is the desire for
912
2002] THREAT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY 913
tence, intentional actions, or to prior violations by an individual
within the previous five years.
The FAA has recently implemented two other programs that
grant some protection to the provider of information used to
enhance safety-Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA).44
and Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP).145
Under FOQA, participating air carriers routinely collect, ana-
lyze, and furnish to FAA the data from on-board recorders. The
FOQA program is designed to enhance line operational safety,
training effectiveness, operational procedures, maintenance and
engineering, ATC procedures and airport surface issues. This
objective is accomplished by using the accumulated data to de-
tect technical flaws, unsafe practices, or conditions outside of
desired operating procedures early enough to allow timely inter-
vention to avert accidents or incidents. 146
In ASAP, certain employees of participating air carriers and
major repair stations voluntarily report safety issues and events.
The content of the ASAP report may not generally be used as
evidence for any purpose in an FAA enforcement action. The
program is essentially a partnership between the FAA, the certif-
icate holder, and any third party, such as an employee's labor
the cooperation of pilots in the safety program that is the policy behind the pro-
gram rather than merely to provide protection from self-incrimination.
144 See Policy on the Use for Enforcement Purposes of Information Obtained from an Air
Carrier Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) Program, Dep't. of Transp., 63
FED. REG. 67505 (Dec. 7, 1998); Flight Operational Quality Assurance Program,
65 FED. REG. 41528 (Jul. 5, 2000); and HBAT 00-11/HBAW 00-10 FOQA Program
Approval Procedures and Continued Program Monitoring (Jul. 26, 2000).
145 FAA Advisory Circular No. AC 120-66A "Aviation Safety Action Program"
(Mar. 17, 2000).
146 U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Safety: Efforts to Implement
Flight Operational Quality Assurance Programs, Doc. No. GAO/RCED-98-10
(1997).
The FAA Administrator issued policy statements as early as February of 1995 re-
garding the use of FOQA information for enforcement purposes in letters to the
Presidents of ALPA ATA. Letter from D.R. Hinson, Administrator, FAA to J.R.
Babbitt, President, Air Line Pilots Association, (Feb. 9, 1995) (on file with the
FAA); Letter from D.R. Hinson, Administrator, FAA to J. E. Landry, President,
Air Transport Association (Feb. 9, 1995) (on file with the FAA). The Administra-
tor committed that " . . . it will not use information collected by a carrier in an
FOQA program to undertake any certificate or other enforcement action against
an air carrier participating in such a program or one of its individual employees.
Notwithstanding, the FAA reserves its right to use, for any other purpose, infor-
mation obtained from sources other than FOQA, including flight recorder pa-
rameters specifically required by the Federal Aviation Regulations. The
limitation on the use of information applies only to information collected specifi-
cally in an FOQA program." Id.
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organization or their representatives. As with ASRP, the re-
ported event must not appear to involve criminal activity.
Congress sought to put teeth into the immunity these pro-
grams provide in order to encourage the voluntary submission
of information by mandating that the FAA protect such informa-
tion. 147 The FAA complied by issuing FAR Part 193, effective
July 25, 2001,148 which generally provides that protected infor-
mation will not be disclosed. Unfortunately, Part 193 includes
significant exceptions to the protections against disclosure that
may be capable of engulfing the rule. For instance, while "the
FAA expects to propose to designate information it will receive
under FOQA and under ASAP as protected under [Part
193],' it has yet to do so. Further, the protection does not
apply to conditions that compromise safety or security in cases
where those conditions continue uncorrected, 5 ' or to informa-
tion provided during a criminal investigation or prosecution.15 '
Finally, Part 193 stops short of protecting information from use
in enforcement actions, instead promising that the FAA will do
so by separate policy or rule. 15 2 To date, only the FOQA pro-
gram has been extended enforcement protection. 5 ' In light of
the concern of the aviation community that the threat of crimi-
nal prosecutions will prevent witnesses from being totally forth-
147 Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, PUB. L. 104-264 (Oct. 3,
1996) (adding relevant section at 49 U.S.C. § 40123).
The FAA Administrator issued policy statements as early as February of 1995 re-
garding the use of FOQA information for enforcement purposes in letters to the
Presidents of ALPA ATA. Letter from D.R. Hinson, Administrator, FAA to J.R.
Babbitt, President, Air Line Pilots Association, (Feb. 9, 1995) (on file with the
FAA); Letter from D.R. Hinson, Administrator, FAA to J. E. Landry, President,
Air Transport Association (Feb. 9, 1995) (on file with the FAA). The Administra-
tor committed that " . .. it will not use information collected by a carrier in an
FOQA program to undertake any certificate or other enforcement action against
an air carrier participating in such a program or one of its individual employees.
Notwithstanding, the FAA reserves its right to use, for any other purpose, infor-
mation obtained from sources other than FOQA, including flight recorder pa-
rameters specifically required by the Federal Aviation Regulations. The
limitation on the use of information applies only to information collected specifi-
cally in an FOQA program." Id.
148 66 FED. REG. 33792 (June 25, 2001). Voluntary disclosures are also ad-
dressed in FAA AC 00-58, Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (May 4,
1998).
149 66 FED. REG. at 33802.
151 14 C.F.R. § 193.9(a) (2).
151 Id. § 193.9(a) (3).
152 Id. § 19 3 .5(g).
153 See new 14 C.F.R. §13.401.
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coming with their knowledge of crucial facts, in 2000, the House
of Representative aviation subcommittee began accepting pro-
posals for creating an immunity bill. Subcommittee Chairman,
John Duncan (R-TN) solicited the NTSB's advice on the pros-
pect of providing blanket immunity during hearings held in July
2000 on the increasing tendency toward criminalization of the
accident-investigation process. So far, however, there is no
short-term prospect for the submission of an immunity bill, or
the implementation of an official policy with respect to the
grant of immunity in aviation-related accident cases.
D. CORPORATE LIABILITY
1. Vicarious corporate criminal liability
A corporation may be held vicariously liable in a criminal fo-
rum for the unlawful conduct of its employees, provided that
such conduct is within the scope of the employee's authority
and performed for the benefit of the corporation.154 Such vica-
rious liability can attach even if the employee's actions are
against explicit corporate policy.'55 Furthermore, it can be im-
posed as a result of tortious activities of the corporation's chief
executive officer (and even its Board of Directors) to its lowest
employee.
The public policy underlying this rule is that the imposition of
liability on a corporation for the acts of its employees will deter
criminal activity in the name of the corporation by denying the
corporation the benefits of the prohibited conduct.'5 6 The pol-
icy underlying corporate liability for the employees' misconduct
154 United States v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 770 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1982).
155 United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660 (2d
Cir. 1989); United States v. Basic Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1983).
An example of the principle of strict corporate liability for actions of a rogue
employee may be seen in the conviction of Aviation Safeguards of Florida, a firm
which provides security personnel at Miami International Airport. The U.S. At-
torney's Office in Miami returned an indictment alleging that the company's for-
mer general manager allowed at least 22 employees into secure areas of the
airport without the required background checks and then lied about it to author-
ities. Aviation Safeguards was prosecuted despite the fact that there was no evi-
dence that company executives knew of or condoned its former employee's
activities. On March 27, 2000, Aviation Safeguards pled guilty to the charges and
has agreed to pay a fine of $110,000.
156 Justice Department policy that charging a corporation does not mean that
individual directors, officers, employees or shareholders should not also be
charged. According to the United States Attorney's Criminal Resource Manual
(USACRM), Title 9, § 162 (I)(B):
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is that corporate management will presumably have a greater
incentive to ensure full compliance with the law by its employees
if it knows that it will be held accountable for their misbehavior.
Thus, if an aviation mechanic were shown to have "pencil
whipped" a job card, his corporate employer could be prose-
cuted along with the employee. Similarly, if a shipping clerk
willfully or recklessly shipped hazardous materials in violation of
the HMR, his corporate employer could share criminal
responsibility.
The DOJ has published guidelines in the U.S. Attorney's Man-
ual (USAM) for prosecutors to use in determining whether to
charge a corporation with criminal misconduct. 157 These guide-
lines were discussed in a memorandum recently issued by Eric
H. Holder, former Deputy Attorney General (the "Holder Mem-
orandum"), in which he declared that the goal of federal prose-
cutors is to prosecute "culpable individuals and, when appropriate,
the corporations on whose behalf they acted."' 58 Prosecutors
are expected to evaluate their decisions whether or not to prose-
cute a corporation in light of certain criteria. Holder makes
clear these are guidelines only and are not necessarily to be ac-
corded equal weight. First, corporations should receive neither
harsher nor more lenient treatment merely because they are
corporations. Second, the purpose of prosecuting corporations
is the "great benefits it provides for law enforcement and the
public, particularly in the area of white collar crime. ' 159 Indeed,
the Deputy Attorney General stressed that the prosecution of
corporations allows the government "to be a force for positive
change of corporate culture, alter corporate behavior, and pre-
vent, discover, and punish white collar crime. '"60
With respect to the high visibility criminal prosecutions in
Valujet and later cases, those accused were not executive employ-
ees engaged themselves in illegal corporate activities. Indeed, it
Prosecution of a corporation is not a substitute for the prosecution of criminally
culpable individuals within or without the corporation. Further, imposition of
individual criminal liability on such individuals provides a strong deterrent
against future corporate wrongdoing.
157 USACRM, Title 9, § 162 (I), et seq.
158 Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., to Heads of Department Compo-
nents and All United States Attorneys, June 16, 1999 (emphasis added). Deputy
Attorney General Holder's memorandum and the accompanying guidelines are
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is often the case that the corporate executive lacks the particu-
larized knowledge, skill, training, certification or qualifications
the FAA demands of those who are most likely to be the true
agents of wrongdoing within the corporation. The prosecution
of executives for the failure of their subordinates to meet the
standards of care imposed upon them individually by the FARS
is not the traditional means of punishing white collar criminals,
since these executives lack the requisite mens rea to justify the
imposition of criminal penalties. Therefore, if stamping out
white-collar crime is really the intended goal of prosecutors, it
would appear that the imposition of corporate liability in the
aviation context should not be the preferred goal of criminal
investigations following aircraft accidents.
According to the USAM and the memorandum and guide-
lines, the specific factors to be considered in determining
whether a corporate prosecution should be initiated include:
" the existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance
program;
" the corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to im-
plement an effective corporate compliance program or to im-
prove an existing one, to replace responsible management, to
discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to
cooperate with the relevant government agencies;
" collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to
shareholders and employees not proven personally culpable;
and
" the adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such as civil or regula-
tory enforcement actions.'6 1
The DOJ requires prosecutors to be "aware of the specific pol-
icy goals and incentive programs established by the respective
Divisions and regulatory agencies."' 6 2 Starkly absent from this
list of factors is the acknowledgment by the DOJ that the motives
and mandates of other agencies investigating an aircraft acci-
dent may outweigh "the important public benefits" that criminal
prosecutions of corporations are supposed to provide. It is not
enough to claim that these benefits may be derived through the
likelihood that corporations will take "immediate remedial steps
when one is indicted for criminal conduct that is pervasive
throughout a particular industry," when these same prosecutors
cannot point to a form of pervasive criminal conduct in the avia-
16, USACRM, Title 9, § 162 (II) (A).
162 Id. § II.B.
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tion industry in the first place. Indeed, if illegal conduct of any
particular form were to become pervasive in the aviation indus-
try, it would soon be discovered by FAA inspectors and other
professionals charged with the implementation and enforce-
ment of the federal aviation regulations.
Other USAM factors are equally troubling. For example, the
provision pertaining to corporate cooperation requires a corpo-
ration to act as an investigator for the government and to pre-
sume the guilt of its employees before charges are even filed.
This same provision also defines the adequacy of a corporation's
cooperation in terms of its willingness to waive the attorney-cli-
ent privilege and work product protections "both with respect to
its internal investigation and with respect to communications be-
tween specific officers, directors, employees and counsel."'163
In addition, in weighing whether a corporation's cooperation
is deemed significant enough to gain any benefit, prosecutors
are instructed to consider "whether the corporation appears to
be protecting its culpable employees and agents."' 4 In making
that assessment federal prosecutors are instructed to determine
whether the corporation is advancing attorney's fees to its em-
ployees, whether it continues to employ those under suspicion,
and whether the corporation shares information with counsel
for its employees under a joint defense agreement." 5
This policy is most disturbing since the above factors signifi-
cantly intrude upon not only the attorney-client privilege, but
also the accused's constitutional right to a presumption of inno-
cence. It also drives a wedge between employers and employees.
Frequently, at the point in time that the government would re-
quire the corporation to fire its employees and cut off all finan-
cial and other support, the government alone is in possession of
evidence which might show employee wrongdoing. Grand jury
investigations are statutorily cloaked in secrecy, 166 and the gov-
ernment traditionally closely guards the nature and extent of its
non-grand jury evidence prior to charges being filed. Thus, a
'63 Id. at § 162 (VI).
164 Id.
165A joint defense agreement is an agreement which allows the sharing of in-
formation between those with similar interests in litigation without waiving appli-
cable privileges. United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336-37 (7th Cir.
1979), Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184-85 (9th Cir. 1965). Unfortu-
nately, this judicially sanctioned procedure is often deemed by prosecutors to
constitute obstructionist behavior.
,(( Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 (e)(2).
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corporation desiring to cooperate with the government often
finds itself in the unenviable position of having to take drastic,
and possibly unwarranted, action against its officers, directors,
and employees solely in reliance on the government's say- so.167
Any requirement which drives a wedge between employer and
employee following an aviation incident will adversely impact
the NTSB's ability to protect the traveling public.
2. The "Collective Knowledge" Doctrine
The theory underlying the collective knowledge doctrine is
that a corporation is deemed to know the totality of the informa-
tion possessed by all of its employees.' 68 Under this doctrine, it
is possible to hold a corporation criminally liable even though
no single corporate employee is responsible for any wrongdo-
ing. For example, consider a case in which ABC Airline's corpo-
rate counsel in Miami is aware of the complicated Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulations involving
the transportation of hazardous waste; meanwhile, an ABC Air-
line mechanic in New York removes a defective part from an
aircraft - which he knows to constitute hazardous waste under
RCRA regulations - and forwards it to the Airline's shipping de-
partment for proper disposal. Thereafter, an ABC Airline ship-
ping clerk, unaware of either the regulations or the fact that the
part is considered to be hazardous waste, decides to mail the
part back to the manufacturer for repair without complying with
the hazardous waste transportation requirements. Under the
above scenario, each and every element of a criminal RCRA vio-
lation has been satisfied by ABC's employees, despite the fact
that no employee intended to violate - or did violate - the law.
Nonetheless, the corporation would be deemed to have knowl-
edge of all of these facts.
167 Requiring this type of action against corporate officers, directors, and em-
ployees flies in the face of many States' corporate statutes either requiring or
allowing indemnification of corporate employees for investigations prior to a for-
mal determination of their guilt or when acting on behalf of the corporation in
good faith. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.0850 (West 2002). The Justice Depart-
ment Guidelines attempt to reconcile this conflict only as to those State statutes
which make the payment of legal fees of officers under investigation mandatory
prior to a formal determination of their guilt. In that event, prosecutors are
instructed that "[o]bviously, a corporation's compliance with governing law
should not be considered a failure to cooperate." USACRM, supra note 151, at
§ 162 (VI) n.3.
168 The leading case in this area is United States v. Bank of New England, 821
F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).
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It is important to note that the collective knowledge doctrine
addresses only a corporation's knowledge. It does not address the
element of specific intent. Therefore, in specific intent
crimes-as opposed to those offenses (like RCRA) requiring
only general intent - the element of intent should not be aggre-
gated from several employees to prove corporate intent.'69 Nev-
ertheless, prosecutors in both the federal and state cases against
SabreTech attempted to utilize the collective knowledge doc-
trine to establish the element of specific intent against the cor-
poration. Moreover, the federal authorities went so far as to
argue that it was not only the knowledge of SabreTech's employ-
ees that could be aggregated to prove corporate intent, but also
the information contained in corporate files and manuals,
whether or not there was any evidence that employees were
aware of those materials. 17"
Criminal sanctions are ineffective to deter behavior that is
neither intended nor foreseen. FAA enforcement procedures
and remedies are adequate to identify and address these issues.
A public policy that prefers to approach problems involving cor-
porate programs and policies in terms of long-term safety in-
stead of short term punishment cannot survive in an
atmosphere of punitive redress of technical violations of the law
by individuals, acting alone, or in their corporate capacity. In-
deed, criminal prosecutions under the collective knowledge
doctrine actually serve to undermine and counteract the es-
poused policies of the USAM with respect to bringing criminal
charges against corporations.
E. DEGREES OF CULPABILITY
Conviction of a criminal offense requires that a certain level
of culpability exist in the mind of the accused.' 7 ' Although the
labels are often loosely defined, possible degrees of culpability
range from no fault up to an intentionally committed act. 172
169 See Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 670 n.6 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 690 F. Supp. 256,
260 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. LBS - N.Y., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 496, 501 n.7
(E.D. Pa. 1990).
170 Taking a similar approach, the Florida state authorities have publicly ad-
vanced the position that SabreTech is criminally liable for homicide, despite the
fact that no individual SabreTech employees committed a crime.
171 For a thorough discussion of the varying degrees of culpability, see generally,
Kolczynski, supra note 6, at 12-20.
172 Id.
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The greater the degree of negligence, the greater the chance of
criminal liability. To be found guilty of committing a crime, an
individual generally must act with some degree of criminal in-
tent-mens rea.
173
In connection with aviation-related cases, various standards of
criminal intent have supported manslaughter convictions.1 7 4 In
Pritchett v. Florida, for instance, a manslaughter conviction was
upheld where the pilot demonstrated "reckless indifference to
the rights of others which is equivalent to an intentional viola-
tion of them.1 75 In Iowa v. Bahl, the court upheld a manslaugh-
ter conviction, noting that the use of alcohol provided evidence
of the necessary intent to commit a crime.'76
Typically, simple negligence or carelessness is insufficient to
establish the level of intent required for a criminal conviction. 7
For instance, in 1951 case, a military pilot was tried for the
deaths of three Maryland residents when his B-25 aircraft
crashed into a home after the crew had been forced by a land-
ing gear problem to bail out of the aircraft.1 78 The court held
173 Id. Speaking of the issue of intent as it relates to criminal prosecutions of
TCA violations in the Los Angeles area, the regional counsel for the FAA said
criminal prosecution was not appropriate because the incidents "are inadvertent
and lack criminal intent." Malnic, supra note 14, at 1.
174 Kolczynski, supra note 6, at 20-21 (citing C. Torcia, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW § 168 (14th ed. 1979)).
175 Pritchett v. State, 414 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). The use of
alcohol may also raise the degree of culpability to that of recklessness. State v.
Kernes, 262 N.W.2d 602, 606 (Iowa 1978) (reversing manslaughter conviction
due to confusing jury instructions combining the terms "recklessly," "heedlessly"
and "negligently," where manslaughter conviction may not be based on mere
negligence). Although Kernes is not in the context of an aircraft accident, it ap-
propriately explains the that prior actions, such as drinking alcoholic beverages,
may elevate the resulting incident to a criminal level, by distinguishing them
from cases of mere negligence that might result from simple errors in judgment.
The use of alcohol has also supported a finding of intentional criminal conduct
in lesser cases than manslaughter. In Ward, the pilot was found to have "buzzed"
a local apartment building, with evidence indicating that he did so under the
influence of alcohol. Ward v. State, 374 A.2d 1118 (Md. 1977).
176 Iowa v. State, 242 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976).
177 Jones, supra note 5, at 10 (stating that there must be gross negligence or
"reckless and intentional disregard for the safety of others" to support a criminal
conviction); See, e.g., Bahl, 242 N.W.2d at 301 (mere negligence is insufficient to
support a manslaughter conviction).
178 State v. Chapman, 101 F. Supp. 335 (D. Md. 1951). The military pilot was
placed on trial for the deaths of three Prince George's County, Maryland re-
sidents when his unoccupied B-25 bomber crashed into a home. The evidence in
the case was to the effect that the decision to abandon the aircraft was made by
the pilot only after extensive consultation with military authorities on the
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that a conviction for involuntary manslaughter requires a show-
ing of gross negligence in the form of conduct that amounts to
wanton or reckless disregard for human life; simple negligence
is not enough.'79
At the heart of the concern over the perceived trend of in-
creased prosecutions is the discomfort with aviation profession-
als being prosecuted as criminals when they had no intent to
commit a crime-that is, when a prosecution is pursued for neg-
ligent or reckless conduct. The concern is that their prosecu-
tions may hinder, rather than promote, aviation safety. This
concern is particularly troublesome in aviation, where benefits
from prosecution under these circumstances are offset by the
significant costs associated with the prosecutions. There are sev-
eral reasons why criminal prosecutions of aviation professionals
are not necessary to achieve the goals of aviation safety.
First, aviation accidents are the subject of an established pro-
cedure for investigating the circumstances surrounding an acci-
dent and a determining its cause. The candor traditionally
enjoyed by the NTSB is damaged by the threat of prosecution of
aviation professionals for mistakes. It does not matter if this
threat does not materialize, since the damage is done by the
threat itself. For example, five years after the crash of Valujet
592, and more than two years after the crash of Alaska Airlines
Flight 261, only a single charge of willful failure to train has
been upheld in the Valujet case, and no charges have been
brought against Alaska Airlines.""( It could be argued that the
system worked since almost all of those prosecuted and investi-
gated were not actually convicted. But, that argument would ig-
nore the considerable damage that occurs well before
convictions are obtained. Even though the individuals and com-
panies were not convicted, aviation safety was damaged by the
five years of investigation that preyed on the minds of aviation
professionals watching the investigation unfold and asking
ground, including his fellow pilots and maintenance personnel. The court found
that the conduct leading to the decision to bail out did not constitute gross negli-
gence under Maryland law in those circumstances. Indeed, the court noted that
"[i]f the resultant deaths were merely accidental or the result of a misadventure
or due to simple negligence, or an honest error of judgment in performing a
lawful act, the existence of gross negligence should not be found." Id. at 341.
179 Id.
180 AVweb NewsWire, Dec. 24, 2001, at http://www.avweb.com/newswire/
news0152a.html.
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themselves how cooperative they would be if they ever faced an
investigation.
Second, ample deterrence against similar future conduct by
other similarly situated professionals does not depend on these
criminal prosecutions. The threat of legal enforcement action
by the FAA has, for decades, provided deterrence to such con-
duct. This enforcement action may even extend to an individ-
ual's ability to perform his job, since the FAA may take
enforcement action against the certificates that are a pre-requi-
site to employment for many aviation professionals. The value
added by criminal prosecutions for unintentional conduct does
not justify the damage to the ability of NTSB investigators to
obtain forthright responses to questions posed in the wake of an
aviation accident.
Finally, pilots and mechanics that fly on the aircraft they
maintain routinely face the most important deterrent of all to
negligent conduct, since they are as likely to be a victim of their
negligence as any other individual.
The damage done to aviation safety by prosecutions under-
taken where there is no clear intent to commit a crime does not
justify the marginal benefit that might result from such prosecu-
tions. This does not mean that there is no role for criminal
prosecution in aviation, since such prosecutions continue to be
appropriate where there is clear evidence of intent to commit a
crime. As noted earlier, there are numerous examples of cases
where aviation accidents result from criminal intent. Examples
include hijacking and terrorism, drunken flying, and theft of an
aircraft. Where this intent does not exist, however, the benefits
of prosecution are outweighed by the costs.
The application of criminal laws should be reserved only in
cases where there is independent evidence of intentional crimi-
nal activity. This standard should be similar to the standards
expressed in the NTSB Amendments Act of 2000. In other
cases, prosecutors should look to the existing administrative
framework to promote aviation safety.
F. THE PREEMPTION ISSUE
Violations of state criminal laws may complicate matters and
may further impact aviation safety adversely by permitting state
prosecutors to insinuate themselves into federal aircraft acci-
dent investigations. In the United States, the existence of fed-
eral and state laws which purport to address the same subject
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matter raise the issue of federal preemption of state law.'' In
some cases, the federal statute expressly states that preemption
does not apply. For example, the regulation requiring drug test-
ing of aviators in the commercial setting states: "The issuance of
[these regulations] does not preempt provisions of state crimi-
nal law that impose sanctions for reckless conduct of an individ-
ual that leads to actual loss of life, injury, or damage to property
whether such provisions apply specifically to aviation employees
or generally to the public."' 2
In other cases, the intent is not so clear. The Supreme Court
outlined its guidance for preemption issues in Building and Con-
struction Trades Council of Metropolitan District v. Associated Builders
and Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc. 1 3 A state law is
valid in the absence of either an explicit provision in the federal
law preempting state law, or evidence, upon review of the "total-
ity of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field
to the exclusion of the States." '184
The issue of preemption in the aviation field was the sole is-
sue raised on appeal in Ward v. Maryland.8 5 In that case, the
Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of a pilot for
violating a state reckless flying order and ruled that the state law
was not preempted by the federal law.' 86 The court first looked
to the legislative history and concluded there was no express in-
tent of Congress to displace state criminal law through the Fed-
18, This constitutional issue is often raised as a result of the power of Congress
"To regulate commerce ...among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Where a regulation of Congress conflicts with a regulation by the states in the
same area, the federal regulation may preempt the state law through the
Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONs-r. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land."). In areas where Congress does not have an enumer-
ated power to regulate, pursuant to Article I of the Constitution, or in cases
where there is no conflict, the state retains its authority to regulate. U.S. CONST.
amend X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
182 14 C.F.R. pt. 121, App. I, XI, (B); see aLso Stuart J. Starry, Torts at Twenty
Thousand Feet: Federal Preemption in Commercial Aviation, Fall, 1993 Section of Tort
& Ins. Practice of the A.B.A. 23 Brief 8 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) ([N]o
state ... shall enact or enforce any law ... relating to rates, routes, or services of
any air carrier . . . ")).
183 Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders &
Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218 (1993).
184 Id. at 224.
185 Ward v. State, 374 A.2d 1118, 1121 (Md. 1977).
186 Id. at 1126; Jones, supra note 5, at 9.
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eral Aviation Act, even when the Act was amended to include
criminal penalties in 1961.187 In fact, the legislative framers said
explicitly that the federal law was intended to "be in addition to
the State criminal law."1"8
The Ward court next looked to whether the state law con-
flicted with the federal law. They found that the Maryland law
"enhances the Congressional purposes ... by deterring through
criminal sanctions" the same offenses prohibited by federal law,
which afforded only civil sanctions. 189 Since it did not conflict
with federal law, the state reckless flying statute was held to be
valid.
The issue of preemption was also raised in Ohio v. Collins, ad-
dressing the subject of pilot licensing.19 Ohio law required that
the operator of an aircraft possess a valid airman's license and
present it upon the demand of a law enforcement officer.191
Like the Ward court, the Collins court found that the statutes
were valid because they were not expressly preempted by the
federal legislation and were not in direct conflict with the legis-
lation. 192 The court went further to note that the Ohio statute
strengthened, rather than conflicted with, the federal statute, by
providing for criminal sanctions in addition to the federal civil
sanctions. 9
187 Ward, 374 A.2d at 1124 (referring to 49 U.S.C.A. § 14 7 2(i)-(p)).
188 Id. (quoting 1961 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News 2563, 2564).
i9 Id. at 1125. The dissenting judges concurred that the imprisonment por-
tion was not preempted, but felt that matters dealing with pilot licensing were
subject only to federal regulation. Thus, the state could not prohibit an airman
from flying when he holds a federal license since that would provide a conflict
with the federal regulation. Id. at 1127 (Eldridge,J., dissenting in part). An early
New Jersey case held that the state could not simply adopt the federal aviation
regulations; the legislature was instead required to delineate the specific rules to
be adopted. State v. Larson, 160 A. 556 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1932). This was
distinguished by the court in Ward as being a result of the specifics of the New
Jersey Constitution that would not allow the legislature to take this approach to
adopting the federal standards of aviation. Ward, 374 A.2d at 1125. For a case
very similar to the holding of Ward, see People v. Valenti, 200 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that federal regulatory system did not
preempt the field and preclude state statutes from imposing criminal sanctions).
190 State v. Collins, 480 N.E.2d 1132 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
19' Id. at 1134.
192 Id. at 1135. The court noted that preemption had been found in cases
dealing with noise abatement, but did not feel that the subject of pilot licensing
was as "pervasive" as the regulation of aircraft noise regulations. Id.. The court
did not go into any further detail as to why a federal licensing program requiring
all aviators to be licensed was not "pervasive."
193 Id.
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A conflict over the realm of pilot licensing was also collaterally
raised in Prouse.'94 As part of the sentence in that case, the dis-
trict court had precluded the defendants from flying for one
year and from carrying passengers for three years. 9 ' The de-
fendants argued that the power to suspend an airman's license
rested exclusively with the FAA and that the court's action repre-
sented a suspension by the State of their federally issued li-
cense.' 96 The appellate court, however, decided that the penalty
did not represent an attempt to usurp the domain of the FAA,
but rather was "a penalty reasonably related to the nature and
circumstance of the offense. '" '197
To date, one of the most sweeping preemption decisions was
that made by the Third Circuit in Abdullah v. American Airlines,
Inc.,1 98 in which the court held that the Federal Aviation Act
completely preempts the field of aviation safety, but allows for
state and territorial tort remedies for a violation of the applica-
ble federal standards. 1
99
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Federal, state and local criminal laws exist to allow a sovereign
state the power to assert authority over unlawful acts committed
in the airspace within their respective jurisdictions. Use of this
authority, however, must be measured and balanced against the
strong policy of maintaining safety in air commerce.
The requirement to maintain safety in the skies justifies the
need to ascertain and gather the critical information and facts
surrounding every aviation accident or incident. The overall ef-
fectiveness of the accident investigation team requires the coop-
eration of all who have knowledge of the accident, or the
circumstances that led to it, even if such cooperation reveals in-
formation that possibly could inculpate an individual or corpo-
ration criminally. The pressing need for this accident
information, combined with its potentially self-incriminating na-
ture, justifies some limited use immunity to ensure full disclo-
sure of all relevant facts to investigators at the earliest possible
time in the investigative process. Further, when only uninten-
94 United States v. Prouse, 945 F.2d 1017, 1026 (8th Cir. 1991).
195 Id. at 1026.
196 Id.
197 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (1988)).
198 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).
l 9 See 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 403 (1999) for a further discussion of this impor-
tant case.
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tional acts or omissions are involved, criminal punishments gen-
erally do not serve a purpose beyond those that can be imposed
in administrative civil proceedings.
Criminal laws should be resorted to only in those cases where
there is independent evidence of intentional criminal activity,
much like the standards now enunciated in the NTSB Amend-
ments Act of 2000. A prima facie case of criminal intent should
be made, for example, whenever an accident or incident occurs
as a result of alcohol or drug use, or as a consequence of the
lack of requisite airman certification while piloting an aircraft.
The existing administrative framework is sufficient to address
the vast majority of acts and omissions, other than those involv-
ing criminal mens rea, and provides penalties and fines sufficient
to deter future behavior and to promote aviation safety.
Given the competing interests of criminal law and civil admin-
istrative law, both of which are justifiable means to the common
end of punishing wrongdoing and promoting aviation safety, we
offer the following recommendations:
1. Aviation safety and security are the paramount considera-
tions following any aviation accident. The determination of
probable cause should be the primary focus of every accident
investigation, except in those cases where there are clear in-
dications of criminal or terrorist activity as the precipitating
cause of the crash.
2. Criminal investigations at the accident scene itself should be
initiated only upon a reasonable suspicion that an inten-
tional act was the primary cause of the accident.
3. Criminal investigation of acts of omission should not justify
immediate insinuation of criminal investigators into the
probable cause of the investigation. ,
4. Eliminate criminal prosecutions in aviation accidents under
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (which has been interpreted expansively by
the courts, in part due to the comprehensive regulatory
scheme under which the FAA operates) absent evidence of
intentional falsification of a document with the intent to
commit or cover up a crime, or to facilitate the commission
of a criminal act by an accomplice.
5. Immunity from prosecution should be available to every wit-
ness called upon by the NTSB or the FAA to provide factual
information deemed necessary to a determination of the
causes-in-fact of the accident.
6. We join in the recommendations by Marshall Filler, counsel
for the Aeronautical Repair Station Association, made on
July 27, 2000, before the Aviation Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
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chaired by Congressman John Duncan (R-TN) ( restated and
amplified here):
a. Legislation should be adopted prohibiting the use of any
information provided in an NTSB or FAA accident inves-
tigation against the provider of that information in a sub-
sequent criminal case, except in a prosecution for
perjury or giving a false statement.
b. NTSB, FAA, and the DOJ are urged to jointly develop a
policy that provides specific guidance to prosecutors as to
when it is appropriate to institute a criminal investigation
of a transportation accident. This policy should be based
on the premise that criminal prosecution should be selec-
tive and undertaken only when it will enhance the safety
or security of the flying public and when it will not im-
pede investigations by the NTSB or the FAA into the
causes of the accident.
7. Criminal investigation of high visibility accidents, on that ba-
sis alone, should be discouraged since the primary goal of
accident investigation is safety, not publicity, or the desire to
show preferred treatment to a celebrity, or the perceived
need to quell public outcries.
8. In general, a State should avoid involvement in an aviation
accident investigation, absent the need to vindicate some
paramount State interest.
9. The NTSB/FAA must be permitted to gather all evidence
first or, at worst, simultaneously with criminal investigators in
all cases, including those accidents in which known crimi-
nal/terrorist activity is suspected as the precipitating cause of
the accident.
10. The aviation community has embraced a system that encour-
ages and facilitates voluntary compliance; this system is more
effective than one based on punishment. In furtherance of
this principle, the FAA has adopted a new Federal Aviation
Regulation (14 C.F.R. § 13.401 (2001)), which codifies en-
forcement protection for FOQA programs, except for crimi-
nal or deliberate acts. This protection should be extended
to all voluntary reporting cooperative programs, including
ASAP. In addition, FAR 193 protection against the release of
voluntarily submitted information, a policy that is strongly
supported by the NTSB, should be implemented by the FAA
designating information from both the FOQA and the ASAP
programs as protected under §193.5.
11. As the ATA recommended at the House subcommittee hear-
ing in July, 2000, Congress should expand the protection of
voluntary reporting programs by enacting a "self-critical anal-
ysis" privilege. This would codify by statute a mechanism to
encourage self-auditing practices by companies to discover
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and correct violations before they become accidents. The gov-
ernment would not be able to use material generated volun-
tarily for safety-compliance reasons against company officials.
Absent this privilege, a company that voluntarily performs
self-audits or creates other self-critical documents could have
those documents subpoenaed and used against the com-
pany. This, in turn, deters companies from performing
these self-critical reviews and limits their ability to improve
safety.
12. Limit criminal prosecutions to those cases where mens rea
based upon criminal intent, transferred intent (i.e., acts of
mischief not necessarily directed at the individual/aircraft
involved in the accident, but which are designed to cause an
accident of some kind), or willful and wanton misconduct is
the standard of proof, thereby eliminating mere mistakes,
negligence, or gross negligence as a basis for criminal
prosecutions.
13. Prosecutors should be more judicious in prosecuting corpo-
rations merely for employing individuals suspected of com-
mitting acts that contribute to an accident. The mens rea
standard for such prosecutions should be that possessed by
those corporate officers or employees upon whose criminal
misdeeds the proposed prosecutions are based. Further,
even though corporations can theoretically be criminally re-
sponsible even where no individual employee commits a
criminal act ("the collective knowledge doctrine"), prosecu-
tors should still adopt a mens rea standard for the corporate
conduct.
14. Corporate officers, managing employees, and other person-
nel should be advised of their right to retain counsel where
testimony is sought that individuals fear would subject them
to self-incrimination. This is consistent with the spirit of the
McDade Amendment, as expressed in 28 U.S.C. § 530B. No-
tification of this right of counsel should be given by the gov-
ernment at the inception of any investigation, rather than
waiting until the matter reaches a formal stage later. The
attorney should be empowered to negotiate use immunity
for the individual prior to giving the incriminating
testimony.
15. FAA should continue to petition ICAO to urge its member
States to review their laws and regulations to determine
whether the possibility of criminal liability is blocking the
collection and analysis of information that could prevent
accidents.
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APPENDIX A
The NTSB Bar Association, Select Committee on Aviation
Public Policy members are:





Mr. Brengle is a 1976 graduate of the University of California,
Hastings College of the Law, and a 1968 graduate of the United
States Naval Academy. He is a partner in the law firm of Duane
Morris LLP, and practices in the areas of admiralty and aviation
law, corporate/international law, and civil litigation. Mr. Bren-
gle is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, New York, and Mary-
land, and is a member of the Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,
Chester County, New York State, New York County, Maryland
State, and American Bar associations. He has also been desig-
nated a proctor in admiralty by the Maritime Law Association of
the United States. Mr. Brengle is a member of the Ports of Phil-
adelphia Maritime Exchange, the Pennsylvania Defense Insti-
tute, and the Defense Research Institute. Additionally, he is a
member of the Board of Directors of the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board Bar Association and the Chairman of its Ami-
cus Curiae Committee, the Airplane Owners and Pilots
Association, and the National Business Aviation Association, Inc.
Mr. Brengle is a naval aviator with more than 4,000 hours of
total flight time, including 800 instrument hours. He has been
rated by the United States Navy in the following aircraft: P-3
Orion (Lockheed 188 Electra); TS2 Tracker (Grumman twin
engine), carrier qualified; T28 (North American Texan), carrier
qualified; and T34 (Beechcraft Bonanza). Mr. Brengle also has
civilian experience in the Piper Aerostar, American Yankee,
King Air 200, and Pinto jet aircraft. His civil ratings include
Commercial Pilot, Single Engine Land, Multi-engine Land and
Instrument ratings. Mr. Brengle is a retired Captain in the
United States Navy and a veteran of the Vietnam War. He is the
Vice President of the Board of Directors of the Delaware Valley
Historical Aircraft Association.
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William L. Elder, Esq.
Hogan & Hartson LLP




Mr. Elder is an Associate in the Washington, D.C. office of
Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., where he is a member of the Aviation
Group. His practice focuses on federal administrative matters,
with an emphasis on aviation and general transportation issues.
His practice includes advising clients on FAA certification, main-
tenance and continuing airworthiness, operations, security, haz-
ardous materials transportation regulatory issues, and
representation of clients in FAA civil penalty and certificate en-
forcement actions related to these issues. He represents a broad
spectrum of clients that include foreign and domestic air carri-
ers, other aircraft operators, pilots, repair stations, aerospace
manufacturers, airports, airport tenants, and various govern-
mental organizations. He also works in conjunction with mem-
bers of the firm's White Collar Defense Group, representing
aviation clients in civil and criminal government investigations
involving federal aviation safety laws, hazardous materials trans-
portation laws, and other federal laws.
Mr. Elder graduated with honors from the United States Na-
val Academy in 1980, and received his law degree, cum laude,
from the Georgetown University Law Center in 1997. At Ge-
orgetown, he served as an Associate Editor of the American
Criminal Law Review. He joined Hogan & Hartson in 1997.
Mr. Elder is a member of the Maryland and District of Colum-
bia Bars. He is also a member of the National Transportation
Safety Board Bar Association, the Lawyer Pilots Bar Association,
and the Federal Bar Association. Mr. Elder was a naval aviator,
and is retired from the U.S. Naval Reserve. He holds both an
FAA Airline Transport Pilot certificate and an FAA Flight In-
structor certificate, and is a former commercial pilot with a ma-
jor air carrier.
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Darrell J. Green, Esq.
Air Line Pilots Association, Int'l.
1669 Kirby Parkway, Suite 202
Memphis, TN 38120
darrell.green@alpa.org
Darrell Green is a Senior Contract Administrator for the Air
Line Pilots Association (ALPA) in Memphis, Tennessee. His du-
ties include administration of the collective bargaining agree-
ment; assisting with negotiations; handling of grievances
(contractual, discipline, and discharge proceedings); and repre-
sentation of individual pilot members in actions involving the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (airman's license sus-
pensions/revocations), and the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) (safety investigation, including incidents or acci-
dents). Mr. Green is a panel attorney for the Aircraft Owners &
Pilots Association and is the Committee Chairman of the NTSB
Bar Association's Select Committee on Aviation Public Policy.
He has a diploma in Aeronautical Engineering Technology
from Southern Alberta Institute of Technology, a Bachelor of
Science degree in Professional Aeronautics from Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University, and a Doctor of Jurisprudence from
Texas Tech University School of Law. He possesses a Canadian
Airline Transport rating and a U.S. Airline Transport Pilot rat-
ing with a total of 8000 hours flight time. Immediately prior to
joining the FEDEX PILOTS ASSOCIATION in January of 1998
(which merged with ALPA in June 2002) he had a private prac-
tice in Houston, Texas, with an emphasis in aviation. Prior to
private practice and immediately after graduation from law
school, Mr. Green spent two years working for a maritime and
aviation insurance defense firm in Houston.
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Hays Hettinger, Esq.




Mr. Hettinger received his BA and JD degrees from Baylor
University and spent the summer of 1992 in an LLM program at
Georgetown University Law Center. His thirty-three year career
as legal counsel with the Federal Aviation Administration in-
cluded tours as Regional Counsel for the Northwest and South-
west Regions, and was concluded when he retired from the
government in 1994 as Assistant Chief Counsel for Enforcement
in Washington. As Assistant Chief Counsel, he provided execu-
tive direction over the Appellate, Policy & Evaluation and Spe-
cial Programs Branches and national oversight over all of the
enforcement appeals to the Administrator, the full NTSB and
the United States Courts of Appeals. He is a member of the
Texas Bar and currently serves as a consultant to the aviation
practice group at the Winstead firm.
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Martin R. Raskin, Esq.
Raskin & Raskin, P.A.
Grove Forest Plaza, Suite 206
2937 Southwest 27th Avenue
Miami, FL 33133-3703
mraskin@raskinlaw.com
Following his graduation from Seton Hall University School
of Law in 1974, Mr. Raskin served a federal judicial clerkship in
NewJersey. Thereafter, Mr. Raskin held various positions within
the United States Department ofJustice, including Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the District of New Jersey; Special Attorney with the
Organized Crime and Racketeering Section assigned to the
Miami Strike Force; and Chief of the Criminal Division for the
U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida,
where he supervised all criminal prosecutions and appeals in
that federal district.
Mr. Raskin has been in the private practice of law since 1982,
specializing in the area of federal white-collar criminal defense
and related civil and administrative proceedings. Over the
years, he has represented numerous airlines, aircraft repair sta-
tions, and pilots during the course of criminal and grand jury
investigations. He currently represents, among other aviation
clients, SabreTech, Inc., in the federal and state of Florida crimi-
nal cases arising from the crash of Valujet Flight 592.
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